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Abstract		What	Would	I	Do	and	Why?:	Adolescents’	Moral	Reasoning,	Social	Perspective-Taking	Competence,	and	Intended	Action	in	Response	to	Witnessed	Bullying		by			Emily	Jean	Campbell		Doctor	of	Philosophy	in	Education		University	of	California,	Berkeley		Professor	Larry	Nucci,	Co-Chair		Professor	Susan	Holloway,	Co-Chair			Why	do	people’s	moral	judgments—what	they	decide	is	right	or	wrong—often	fail	to	predict	their	actions?	One	prevalent	example	is	the	phenomenon	of	bullying:	though	the	vast	majority	of	young	people	judge	bullying	as	wrong,	a	significant	percentage	of	adolescents	report	having	perpetrated	bullying	behavior,	and	even	more	have	acted	as	bystanders,	i.e.,	have	witnessed	bullying	without	intervening	to	stop	it.	Social	domain	theory	(SDT)	provides	a	framework	for	analyzing	the	reasoning	behind	such	judgments,	based	on	evidence	that	people	distinguish	between	different	domains	of	social	knowledge—moral,	conventional,	personal,	and	prudential—when	reasoning	about	social	situations.	More	research	is	needed	to	investigate	the	relationships	between	domain-based	socio-moral	reasoning,	social-emotional	competencies	such	as	perspective-taking,	and	intended	action	choices,	especially	among	youth.			In	this	dissertation	study,	a	secondary	analysis	using	data	from	the	larger	National	Professional	Development	and	Evaluation	Project,	1402	adolescent	students	(grades	9	and	10)	drawn	from	61	different	high	schools	in	8	regions	across	the	United	States	were	asked	to	respond	to	a	hypothetical	bullying	situation.	In	written	survey-based	responses,	participating	students	rated	potential	reasons	for	a	bystander	to	intervene	in	the	situation	and	choices	for	how	they	could	respond	if	they	were	to	witness	the	situation	themselves.	Next,	students	were	asked	to	select	the	single	choice	of	action	that	they	would	be	most	likely	to	take,	and	then	to	explain	in	their	own	words	why	they	would	make	that	choice.	The	students	also	completed	a	measure	of	social	perspective-taking	competence.	Using	an	SDT	framework	to	examine	the	data,	this	study	focused	on	three	major	research	questions.		For	the	first	research	question,	multilevel	regression	modeling,	with	students	nested	in	schools,	was	used	to	relate	students’	reasoning	and	personal/contextual	factors	(gender,	age,	and	perceived	bullying	prevalence)	to	their	action	choice	ratings,	and	logistic	regression	was	used	to	predict	their	selection	of	a	“best”	action	choice.	Results	indicated	that	endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	was	consistently	positively	related	to	the	choice	to	
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directly	intervene	to	stop	the	bullying	and	negatively	related	to	the	choice	to	bystand,	while	endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	was	positively	related	to	the	choice	to	intervene	indirectly	(i.e.,	tell	a	teacher).	Both	males	and	students	who	perceived	a	greater	prevalence	of	bullying	at	their	school	were	significantly	less	likely	to	endorse/select	either	kind	of	intervention	and	significantly	more	likely	to	endorse/select	bystanding	and	perpetration.	The	second	research	question	involved	coding	students’	free-response	explanations	for	SDT	domains	cited	and	relating	these	to	their	action	choices.	Associations	between	moral/conventional	reasoning	and	action	choices	mirrored	those	found	in	the	first	research	question;	additionally,	students	who	chose	bystanding	often	cited	personal	and	prudential	considerations,	and	some	students	mentioned	relational	and	emotional	concerns	as	well.	Finally,	the	third	research	question	used	mediation	analyses	to	test	for	indirect	effects	of	moral	reasoning	on	action	choices	through	social	perspective-taking	competence,	which	was	positively	associated	with	moral	reasoning	and	with	the	positive	action	choices,	while	negatively	associated	with	the	negative	action	choices.	Significant	indirect	effects	were	found	for	three	of	the	four	action	choices,	supporting	the	idea	that	socio-moral	reasoning	and	social-emotional	competence	work	together	to	produce	moral	functioning.		Findings	are	discussed	in	terms	of	theoretical	and	methodological	implications	for	research	as	well	as	potential	implications	for	practice,	such	as	for	anti-bullying	efforts	in	educational	settings.
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(conventional	domain)	more	heavily	or	give	a	larger	role	to	their	own	personal	preferences	(personal	domain).		However,	most	studies	in	SDT	are	principally	concerned	not	with	individual	differences,	but	with	“universal”	processes	of	socio-moral	reasoning,	i.e.,	the	trends	of	how	most	people	tend	to	think	in	certain	social	situations.	More	research	is	needed	to	investigate	how	different	personal	and	contextual	factors	(i.e.,	factors	beyond	the	details	of	the	immediate	situation)	may	influence	domain-based	socio-moral	reasoning,	as	well	as	on	the	relationship	between	domain-based	socio-moral	reasoning	and	action	choices	in	morally-relevant	situations,	especially	among	youth.	Moreover,	studies	in	SDT	rarely	include	any	information	about	participants’	social-emotional	competencies,	such	as	how	able	and	inclined	they	are	to	perceive	and	understand	their	own	and	others’	feelings,	manage	their	own	emotions	and	behaviors	in	productive	ways,	and	navigate	social	relationships.	Because,	according	to	SDT,	knowledge	in	each	of	the	domains	develops	through	social	experience	and	is	informed	by	emotions	(e.g.,	emotions	can	serve	to	highlight	an	event’s	relevance	to	oneself	and	one’s	important	goals;	Turiel	&	Killen,	2010),	it	seems	likely	that	different	levels	of	social-emotional	competencies	would	influence	how	young	people	think	about	right	and	wrong	in	social	situations	and	how	they	intend	to	behave	when	they	encounter	such	situations.	Therefore,	further	research	is	also	needed	on	the	connections	between	social-emotional	competencies,	socio-moral	reasoning,	and	behavior	(or	at	least	behavioral	intentions).	These	relationships	may	be	especially	important	to	investigate	among	adolescents,	who	are	in	the	midst	of	significant	developmental	shifts	in	cognitive,	social-emotional,	and	behavioral	competencies	that	will	set	the	stage	for	their	adult	identities	and	well-being	(Blakemore	&	Choudhury,	2006;	Steinberg,	2005;	Yeager,	2017).		Thus,	the	main	aim	of	this	dissertation	was	to	explore	how	adolescents	reason	about	the	social	and	moral	aspects	of	a	morally-relevant	situation,	how	this	reasoning	may	relate	to	what	they	might	choose	to	do	in	response	to	the	situation,	and	how	personal/contextual	factors	and	social-emotional	competence	may	play	a	role	in	their	reasoning	and	the	actions	they	intend	to	take.	Specifically,	I	set	out	to	examine	these	questions	with	regards	to	bullying,	which	is	both	a	common	situation	for	adolescents	to	encounter	and	one	that	can	result	in	significant	psychosocial	harm	(Nansel	et	al.,	2001).		In	addition	to	this	primary	theoretical	aim,	there	was	also	a	secondary	methodological	aim,	which	was	to	investigate	written	survey-based	measures	as	a	potential	alternative	method	to	semi-structured	interviews	for	assessing	socio-moral	reasoning	and	related	variables.	Though	survey-based	measures	are	more	limited	in	terms	of	depth	and	clarification	compared	to	the	semi-structured	interviews	that	are	most	often	used	in	SDT	research,	they	are	more	accessible	and	scalable;	therefore,	it	may	be	useful	to	determine	to	what	extent	differences	in	domain-based	socio-moral	reasoning,	as	well	as	theorized	relations	between	such	reasoning	and	other	variables	and	outcomes,	can	be	detected	through	such	measures.		In	the	following	sections,	I	will	first	present	a	brief	overview	of	moral	and	social-emotional	development	in	education.	Then,	I	will	describe	Nucci’s	(2019)	model	of	character	as	a	relational	developmental	system,	which	integrates	the	individual’s	socio-moral	reasoning,	social-emotional	competencies,	and	context,	and	which	serves	as	a	theoretical	framework	for	this	dissertation	study.	Next,	I	will	review	research	on	bullying	among	youth,	specifically	as	it	results	to	components	of	interest	from	the	character	model	
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bullying,	there	is	some	disagreement	on	this	point,	and	not	all	research	on	bullying	explicitly	includes	repetition	as	a	necessary	factor	(Menesini	&	Salmivalli,	2017).	Bullying	can	take	many	different	forms,	both	direct	(e.g.,	physical	or	verbal	aggression)	and	indirect	(e.g.,	social	exclusion,	spreading	rumors,	etc.),	and	can	aim	to	cause	a	variety	of	harms	(such	as	physical/material	harm,	psychological/emotional	harm,	and/or	social/reputational	harm).	Though	the	vast	majority	of	young	people	judge	such	behavior	as	wrong	when	asked	(Gini	et	al.,	2008;	Thornberg,	2014),	meta-analyses	show	that	about	35%	of	adolescents	report	having	perpetrated	some	form	of	“traditional”	(as	opposed	to	cyber)	bullying	behavior	towards	peers	(Modecki	et	al.,	2014).	Though	findings	vary,	studies	indicate	that	even	larger	percentages	of	children	and,	especially,	adolescents	have	acted	as	bystanders,	witnessing	bullying	passively	and	failing	to	intervene	to	stop	it	(see	Trach	et	al.,	2010).	For	theoretical	and	practical	purposes,	it	would	be	useful	to	understand	more	about	the	socio-moral	reasoning	processes,	social-emotional	competencies,	and	personal	and	contextual	factors	that	may	play	into	adolescents’	decisions	about	how	to	respond	to	peer	bullying.	In	the	following	sections,	I	will	review	research	on	how	each	of	the	factors	of	interest	in	this	study	(socio-moral	reasoning,	social-emotional	competence,	gender,	age,	and	perceived	prevalence	of	bullying)	may	relate	to	how	young	people	choose	to	respond	when	they	witness	bullying.	
Socio-moral	reasoning	and	response	to	bullying.	While	several	studies	in	the	SDT	framework	have	examined	connections	between	domain-based	socio-moral	reasoning	and	intended	actions	in	social	situations,	relatively	few	have	investigated	such	relationships	in	the	context	of	bullying	among	adolescents.	In	one	study	that	focused	on	sexual	and	gender-based	harassment	(e.g.,	calling	peers	pejorative	names	based	on	gender	or	sexuality,	teasing	or	excluding	peers	due	to	gender	or	sexual	orientation,	or	sexually	objectifying	peers)	Peter,	Tasker,	and	Horn	(2016)	found	that	adolescents	ranging	in	age	from	12-18	who	believed	that	such	behaviors	cause	emotional	harm	(i.e.,	that	they	are	transgressions	in	the	moral	domain)	were	significantly	less	likely	to	report	having	perpetrated	thirteen	of	the	fifteen	listed	behaviors.	Mediation	analyses	showed	that	perceptions	of	harm	fully	or	partially	mediated	the	negative	relationship	between	perceived	wrongness	(i.e.,	to	what	extent	participants	believed	the	behavior	to	be	“wrong”)	and	reported	perpetration	for	10	of	the	15	actions;	in	other	words,	the	perception	of	moral	harm	was	able	to	explain	to	a	great	extent	why	knowing	that	a	behavior	was	“wrong”	led	to	less	perpetration.	On	the	other	hand,	the	adolescents’	knowledge	of	school	policies	against	such	behaviors	(i.e.,	knowledge	that	they	are	transgressions	in	the	conventional	domain)	was	mostly	unrelated	to	reported	perpetration,	showing	significant	associations	(all	negative)	with	only	three	behaviors.	Moreover,	when	policy	beliefs	were	examined	as	a	potential	mediator	between	perceived	wrongness	and	reported	perpetration,	existence	of	policies	against	the	behavior	were	associated	with	perceived	wrongness	for	only	one	behavior,	and	in	no	cases	were	policy	beliefs	significantly	related	to	reported	perpetration.	These	results	imply	that,	although	adolescents	are	aware	of	social	conventions,	they	do	not	play	as	significant	a	role	in	judgments	and	behavioral	decisions	as	moral	concerns	do.	Further	research	is	needed	to	understand	if	these	patterns	hold	in	contexts	other	than	sexual	or	gender-based	bullying,	as	well	as	how	other	factors	may	interact	with	moral	vs.	conventional	reasoning	to	predict	not	only	perpetration,	but	also	bystander	responses.	In	this	study,	I	look	for	relations	between	domain-based	socio-moral	reasoning	and	intended	bystander	response	in	a	situation	of	bullying	based	on	another	potentially	
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how	often?	What	proportion	of	responses	could	be	coded	with	at	least	one	SDT	domain?		Did	references	to	different	domains	of	reasoning	tend	to	co-occur	within	responses?		
RQ2b:	Relational	and	emotional	considerations.	To	what	extent	do	free	responses	elicit	codes	for	relational	and	emotion-based	reasoning?	Do	these	types	of	reasoning	tend	to	co-occur	with	reasoning	in	certain	SDT	domain(s)?		Because	the	answers	to	question	A7,	which	asked	students	to	explain	why	they	chose	the	action	they	did,	were	free	responses,	I	approached	the	above	sub-questions	with	a	deductive	coding	strategy	drawn	from	qualitative	research	methodology	(Miles,	Huberman,	&	Saldaña,	2014).	Because	the	responses	were	brief,	each	participant	had	only	one	response	(if	they	had	a	response	at	all),	and	deductive	coding	with	pre-determined	categories	was	employed,	I	used	an	Excel	spreadsheet	to	record	the	codes,	with	each	response	(row)	receiving	a	0	or	1	for	each	code	(column).	This	allowed	for	simplicity	of	coding	and	ease	of	analysis.		To	code	the	data	from	the	free-response	question	(A7),	I	went	through	three	rounds	of	deductive	coding.	Details	of	the	coding	guidelines	that	I	used	can	be	found	in	Appendix	C.	In	the	first	round,	I	marked	each	response	as	codable	(1)	or	uncodable	(0;	indicating	that	the	response	was	either	missing	or	illegible,	nonsensical,	or	otherwise	seemingly	irrelevant	to	the	question	asked).		In	the	second	round,	I	coded	all	of	the	codable	responses	deductively	by	SDT	domain	(moral,	conventional,	personal,	prudential),	recording	whether	each	domain	was	(1)	or	was	not	(0)	cited	in	each	response.	(I	also	included	a	“vague/no	domain”	category,	to	be	indicated	if	the	response	could	not	be	clearly	categorized	as	falling	into	any	of	the	four	SDT	domains.)	This	strategy	allowed	me	to	capture	how	many	domains,	as	well	as	which	domains,	were	cited	in	each	response,	as	opposed	to	trying	to	choose	a	single	dominant	domain.	All	cited	domains	were	assumed	to	have	the	same	weight,	as	there	was	no	reliable	way	to	assess	from	these	brief	responses	any	differential	weighting	of	different	considerations.		At	first,	I	had	considered	doing	a	second	round	of	deductive	coding	to	add	sub-codes	under	each	domain	representing	accepted	considerations	within	SDT	that	define	each	domain,	based	on	the	coding	manual	developed	by	Killen	(2014);	for	example,	under	the	moral	domain,	deductive	sub-codes	could	include	physical	harm,	psychological	harm,	and	fairness/equality/rights.	However,	since	my	research	questions	only	used	broad	domain	classifications,	not	sub-domain	distinctions,	I	did	not	code	beyond	the	top-level	domain	codes.	In	the	third	round,	I	went	through	all	of	the	codable	responses	again	to	determine	whether	each	response	cited	relational	considerations	(references	to	the	respondent’s	own	relationship,	or	lack	thereof,	with	the	bullies,	target,	or	community	as	a	factor	in	deciding	how	to	respond)	and/or	emotional	considerations	(references	to	the	role/influence	of	the	respondent’s	own	emotions	in	influencing	their	action	choice).	The	presence	or	absence	of	these	considerations	(0	or	1	for	each)	was	coded	independently	of	the	SDT	coding	in	round	two,	as	the	objective	was	to	explore	patterns	in	how	these	considerations	might	overlap,	or	not,	with	SDT	domains.	At	this	point,	a	second	coder,	blind	to	the	study	hypotheses,	was	enlisted	to	provide	reliability	coding	for	a	portion	of	the	sample	of	responses.	Both	I	and	the	second	coder	were	blind	to	the	other	(numerical)	responses	of	the	participants,	with	the	exception	of	their	selection	of	action	choice	in	A6,	to	which	the	free-response	question	directly	referred.		




































Variables	 1	 2	 3	 4	Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)a	 226	(16.7%)	 222	(16.4%)	 558	(41.2%)	 349	(25.8%)	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)a	 91	(6.8%)	 369	(27.4%)	 626	(46.5%)	 260	(19.3%)	Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)b	 210	(15.5%)	 610	(45.1%)	 419	(31.0%)	 113	(8.4%)	Rating	of	indirect	intervention	(A5a)a	 120	(8.9%)	 305	(22.7%)	 678	(50.4%)	 242	(18.0%)	Rating	of	bystanding	(A5b)a	 255	(19.0%)	 578	(43.0%)	 374	(27.8%)	 136	(10.1%)	Rating	of	direct	intervention	(A5c)a	 54	(4.0%)	 187	(13.9%)	 671	(49.9%)	 434	(32.2%)	Rating	of	perpetrating	(A5d)a	 1125	(83.4%)	 178	(13.2%)	 29	(2.1%)	 17	(1.3%)	Action	choice	selection	(A6)c	 306	(22.8%)	 327	(24.3%)	 677	(48.3%)	 34	(2.5%)	
Note.	Figures	in	parentheses	indicate	valid	percentages,	i.e.,	percentage	of	non-missing	responses	to	each	question.	
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a	For	reasoning	endorsements	(A2a,	A2b)	and	action	choice	ratings	(A5a,	A5b,	A5c,	A5d),	1	=	very	bad,	2	=	bad,	3	=	good,	4	=	very	good.	b	For	perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4),	i.e.,	how	often	this	kind	of	bullying	happens	at	your	school,	1	=	very	rarely,	2	=	rarely,	3	=	often,	4	=	very	often.	c	For	action	choice	selection	(A6),	1	indicates	the	selection	of	action	choice	a	(indirect	intervention)	as	the	“best”/most	likely	to	take,	2	indicates	the	selection	of	b	(bystanding),	3	indicates	the	selection	of	c	(direct	intervention),	and	4	indicates	the	selection	of	d	(perpetrating).				 Due	to	the	clustered	nature	of	the	data,	with	individual	students	(level	1)	nested	into	schools	(level	2),	intraclass	correlations	(ICCs)	were	calculated	for	each	study	variable	from	the	CICM	and	RelQ.	The	choice	to	cluster	students	by	school	only,	not	by	classroom/teacher	in	addition	or	instead,	was	made	because	the	intervention	was	randomized	by	school,	variables	of	interest	evoked	school-level	factors	(e.g.,	perceived	bullying	prevalence	“at	your	school”	in	A4),	and	the	majority	of	schools	had	only	a	single	participating	classroom/teacher,	which	led	to	redundancy	errors	when	attempting	three-level	models	for	some	variables.	All	of	the	items	had	low	ICCs	(<.08)	except	for	the	item	asking	about	perceived	prevalence	of	bullying	at	school	(A4).	This	makes	sense,	as	this	particular	item	tapped	into	perceptions	of	a	shared	environment	rather	than	individual	judgments	and	thoughts.	This	one	item,	A4,	had	an	ICC	of	.128,	meaning	that	12.8%	of	the	variance	in	responses	could	be	attributed	to	differences	between	school	contexts	(level	2)	as	opposed	to	individual	differences	(level	1).	Because	of	this	one	higher	ICC,	multilevel	modeling	was	conducted	in	the	linear	regression	analyses	that	involved	this	variable.			 Bivariate	correlations	were	calculated	between	the	sociodemographic	control	variables	(parental	education	level,	first	language,	race,	and	intervention	group),	the	covariates	of	interest	(gender,	age,	and	perceived	bullying	prevalence),	and	the	predictor	and	outcome	variables	from	the	CICM	and	RelQ-A.	Spearman	correlations	were	used	due	to	the	ordinal	or	categorical	nature	of	many	of	the	variables.	Statistical	significance	was	determined	as	a	two-tailed	p	value	of	less	than	.05;	only	significant	results	are	described	here.		 With	regards	to	the	relationships	among	the	demographic	variables	and	covariates,	several	significant	correlations	were	evident.	Reporting	English	as	one’s	first	language	was	positively	associated	with	parental	education	level	and	with	selecting	Black,	White,	or	two	or	more	races,	while	negatively	associated	with	selecting	Hispanic	or	Asian.	Additionally,	parental	education	level	was	correlated	positively	with	selecting	White	or	two	or	more	races	and	negatively	with	selecting	Hispanic.	Students	in	the	Facing	History	intervention	group	were	more	likely	to	be	female	and	younger	than	the	students	in	the	control	group.	Age	was	not	significantly	related	to	any	of	the	other	control	variables	with	the	exception	of	a	negative	association	with	parental	education.	Male	gender	was	negatively	associated	with	selecting	Black,	while	positively	associated	with	selecting	White	and	with	speaking	English	as	a	first	language.	Perceived	prevalence	of	bullying	at	school	was	also	positively	correlated	with	selecting	White	and	with	speaking	English	as	a	first	language,	and	negatively	correlated	with	selecting	Hispanic.		Correlations	between	the	major	predictor	and	outcome	variables	are	shown	in	Table	3.	For	the	most	part,	relationships	among	these	variables	were	in	the	hypothesized	directions.	Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	in	the	CICM	bullying	scenario	correlated	negatively	with	ratings	of	bystanding	and	perpetrating	as	action	choices	in	response	to	
  28 
witnessing	bullying	and	positively	with	rating	of	direct	intervention	as	an	action	choice.	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning,	on	the	other	hand,	was	only	significantly	correlated	with	rating	of	indirect	intervention	(positively).	Ratings	of	the	two	positive	action	choices	(i.e.,	direct	and	indirect	intervention)	were	positively	correlated	with	each	other	and	negatively	correlated	with	ratings	of	the	two	negative	action	choices	(bystanding	and	perpetrating,	which	also	correlated	positively	with	each	other).	Social	perspective-taking,	as	measured	by	the	IM	subscale	of	the	RelQ-A,	was	positively	correlated	with	endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	and	with	both	of	the	positive	action	choice	ratings,	as	well	as	negatively	correlated	with	the	negative	action	choice	ratings.	Perceived	bullying	prevalence	showed	an	almost	opposite	pattern,	correlating	negatively	with	the	positive	action	choices	and	positively	with	the	negative	action	choices.	Male	participants	showed	the	same	pattern	of	correlations	as	perceived	bullying	prevalence	(namely,	being	male	was	associated	negatively	with	the	positive	action	choices	and	positively	with	the	negative	action	choices);	furthermore,	male	gender	correlated	negatively	with	endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	and	social	perspective-taking.	Age	did	not	show	significant	correlations	with	any	major	variables.		Table	3	
Correlations	Among	Major	Variables	
Variables	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10	1.	Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(CICM	A2a)	 --	 .03	 .03	 -.13	***	 .15	***	 -.11	***	 .21	***	 -.12	***	 -.02	 -.04	2.	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(CICM	A2b)	 .03	 --	 .23	***	 .01	 .05	 -.05	 .04	 -.04	 .01	 -.01	3.	Rating	of	indirect	intervention	(CICM	A5a)	 .03	 .23	***	 --	 -.25	***	 .13	***	 -.24	***	 .19	***	 -.23	***	 -.01	 -.10	***	4.	Rating	of	bystanding	(CICM	A5b)	 -.13	***	 .01	 -.25	***	 --	 -.27	***	 .22	***	 -.22	***	 .11	***	 .02	 .13	***	5.	Rating	of	direct	intervention	(CICM	A5c)	 .15	***	 .05	 .13	***	 -.26	***	 --	 -.14	***	 .10	***	 -.11	***	 -.03	 -.10	***	6.	Rating	of	perpetrating	(CICM	A5d)	 -.11	***	 -.05	 -.24	***	 .22	***	 -.14	***	 --	 -.27	***	 .22	***	 -.02	 .10	***	7.	Interpersonal	Management	subscale	(RelQ-IM)	 .21	***	 .04	 .19	***	 -.22	***	 .10	***	 -.27	***	 --	 -.23	***	 -.00	 -.06	*	8.	Gender	(male)	 -.12	***	 -.04	 -.23	***	 .11	***	 -.11	***	 .22	***	 -.23	***	 --	 .05	 .02	9.	Age	in	years	 -.02	 .01	 -.01	 .02	 -.03	 -.02	 <.01	 .05	 --	 -.01	
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Outcome	 Parameter	 Coeff.	 SE	 df	 t	 Sig.	(p)	Intervene	indirectly	(A5a)	 Intercept	 2.16***	 .10	 1000	 20.99	 <.001	Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 -.003	 .02	 1322.75	 -.15	 .88	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)	 .23***	 .03	 1322.47	 8.51	 <.001	Bystand	(A5b)	 Intercept	 2.52***	 .11	 1051.50	 23.18	 <.001	Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 -.10***	 .02	 1284.19	 -4.08	 <.001	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)	 .01	 .03	 1311.57	 .43	 .67	Intervene	directly	(A5c)	 Intercept	 2.75***	 .09	 1103.09	 29.04	 <.001	Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 .09***	 .02	 1284.17	 4.21	 <.001	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)	 .04	 .03	 1309.56	 1.52	 .13	Intercept	 1.37***	 .07	 1105.21	 20.69	 <.001	
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	.17	.45	.52	.54	.68	In	intervention	group	 .03	 .07	 51.73	 .48	 .64	Bystand	(A5b)	 Intercept	 2.49***	 .21	 929.77	 12.00	 <.001	Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 -.09***	 .03	 1118.04	 -3.59	 <.001	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)	 .01	 .03	 1166.81	 .45	 .65	Parental	education	level	 -.03	 .03	 638.52	 -1.11	 .27	
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	.85	.28	.88	.54	.91	In	intervention	group	 -.01	 .05	 39.40	 -.21	 .83	Perpetrate	(A5d)	 Intercept	 1.49***	 .13	 1058.40	 11.78	 <.001	Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 -.03†	 .02	 1173.95	 -1.80	 .07	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)	 -.02	 .02	 1180.43	 -1.33	 .18	Parental	education	level	 -.03	 .02	 933.69	 -1.60	 .11	First	language	is	English	 .05	 .04	 1177.36	 -1.25	 .21	Race/ethnicitya		 	 	 	 	 	






.54	.55	.21	.11	.49	In	intervention	group	 .00	 .04	 45.51	 .09	 .93	aRace/ethnicity	coded	as	a	series	of	dummy	variables,	with	“Other”	used	as	the	reference	group.	†p	<	.10,	*p	<	.05,	***p	<	.001	(two-tailed)		 When	control	variables	were	added,	as	shown	in	Table	5,	endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	remained	a	positive	predictor	of	ratings	for	indirect	intervention,	and	endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	still	positively	predicted	ratings	of	direct	intervention	and	negatively	predicted	ratings	of	bystanding.	The	negative	relationship	between	moral	reasoning	and	perpetrating	was	reduced	to	marginal	significance,	however.			 Models	3	and	4:	Prediction	by	personal/contextual	factors.	For	the	next	set	of	models,	the	same	procedure	was	followed,	except	with	gender,	age	in	years,	and	perceived	bullying	prevalence	as	predictors	in	place	of	moral	and	conventional	reasoning.			 Results	are	shown	in	Table	6.	As	compared	with	female	participants,	male	participants	gave	significantly	lower	ratings	to	the	positive	action	choices	(direct	and	indirect	intervention)	and	significantly	higher	ratings	to	the	negative	action	choices	(bystanding	and	perpetrating).	Student	participants	who	perceived	bullying	as	happening	more	often	at	their	own	schools	showed	this	same	pattern	of	inclination	towards	negative	action	choices	and	away	from	positive	ones.	Age	did	not	significantly	predict	any	of	the	action	choice	rating	outcomes.		Table	6	
Multilevel	Linear	Regression	Model	3:	Prediction	of	Action	Choice	Ratings	by	Personal/Contextual	
Factors	
Outcome	 Parameter	 Coeff.	 SE	 df	 t	 Sig.	(p)	Intervene	indirectly	(A5a)	 Intercept	 2.53***	 .60	 693.69	 4.21	 <.001	Gender	(1	=	male,	0	=	female)	 -.38***	 .05	 1303.37	 -8.29	 <.001	Age	in	years	 .04	 .04	 672.74	 1.03	 .30	Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	 -.08**	 .03	 1258.83	 -2.96	 .003	Bystand	(A5b)	 Intercept	 1.28*	 .63	 509.38	 2.02	 .04	Gender	(1	=	male,	0	=	female)	 .19***	 .05	 1272.72	 3.86	 <.001	
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Outcome	 Parameter	 Coeff.	 SE	 df	 t	 Sig.	(p)	Intervene	indirectly	(A5a)	 Intercept	 2.65***	 .13	 1013.59	 20.72	 <.001	Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 -.02	 .02	 1304.46	 -1.11	 .27	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)	 .22***	 .03	 1305.90	 8.35	 <.001	Gender	(1	=	male,	0	=	female)	 -.38***	 .05	 1302.93	 -8.38	 <.001	Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	 -.08**	 .03	 1259.65	 -2.98	 .003	First	language	is	English	 -.08	 .05	 795.32	 -1.52	 .13	Bystand	(A5b)	 Intercept	 2.05***	 .13	 1000.33	 15.69	 <.001	Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 -.08**	 .02	 1216.51	 -3.35	 .001	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)	 .01	 .03	 1265.80	 .36	 .72	Gender	(1	=	male,	0	=	female)	 .20***	 .05	 1138.17	 4.04	 <.001	Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	 .13***	 .03	 977.13	 4.55	 <.001	Race/ethnicity	=	Black	 .28***	 .07	 247.06	 3.81	 <.001	Intervene	directly	(A5c)	 Intercept	 3.08***	 .12	 1095.52	 26.74	 <.001	Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 .07***	 .02	 1248.75	 3.55	 <.001	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)	 .04	 .03	 1280.34	 1.46	 .14	Gender	(1	=	male,	0	=	female)	 -.18***	 .04	 1217.93	 -4.16	 <.001	Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	 -.09***	 .03	 1077.94	 -3.53	 <.001	Perpetrate	(A5d)	 Intercept	 1.16***	 .09	 909.21	 13.51	 <.001	Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 -.02	 .01	 1278.35	 -1.49	 .14	
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Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)	 -.02	 .02	 1275.96	 -1.06	 .29	Gender	(1	=	male,	0	=	female)	 .21***	 .03	 1260.92	 7.32	 <.001	Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	 .07***	 .02	 1195.75	 3.80	 <.001	Parental	education	level	 -.03*	 .01	 404.35	 -2.38	 .02	*p	<	.05,	**	p	<	.01,	***p	<	.001	(two-tailed)	As	shown	in	Table	8,	the	patterns	of	significance	in	Model	5	did	not	change	from	those	in	Models	2	and	4,	for	the	most	part.	Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	still	positively	predicted	direct	intervention	ratings	and	negatively	predicted	bystanding	(though	the	negative	relationship	with	perpetrating	was	reduced	to	nonsignificance);	endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	still	only	predicted	indirect	intervention	(positively);	and	both	male	gender	and	greater	perception	of	bullying	at	school	positively	predicted	ratings	of	negative	action	choices	and	negatively	predicted	ratings	of	positive	action	choices.	The	control	variable	effects	that	remained	significant	in	this	model	included	that	selecting	Black	(vs.	all	other	race/ethnicity	categories)	related	positively	to	ratings	of	bystanding	and	that	parental	education	level	related	negatively	to	ratings	of	perpetrating.	
Model	6:	Adding	interaction	terms.	To	test	for	any	interaction	effects	between	the	reasoning	variables	and	the	personal/contextual	factors	in	the	prediction	of	action	choice	ratings—or,	in	other	words,	to	determine	if	one	or	more	of	the	factors	functioned	as	moderators	of	the	relationship	between	reasoning	and	action	choices—interaction	terms	were	added	to	Model	5.		More	specifically,	the	significant	predictors	from	Model	5	for	each	outcome	(action	choice	rating)	were	retained,	and	four	interaction	terms	were	added	to	each	analysis:	gender	(Male)	x	moral	reasoning	endorsement	(A2a),	gender	(Male)	x	conventional	reasoning	endorsement	(A2b),	perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	x	moral	reasoning	endorsement	(A2a),	and	perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	x	conventional	reasoning	endorsement	(A2b).	Interaction	terms	were	not	created	for	age,	as,	again,	it	did	not	show	any	significant	relationships	in	any	of	the	preceding	analyses.		None	of	the	interaction	terms	for	any	of	the	outcomes	turned	out	to	be	significant,	except	for	one:	in	the	prediction	of	ratings	for	perpetrating	as	an	action	choice	(A5d),	the	interaction	between	endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)	and	perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	was	significant	at	the	.05	level.	The	results	for	the	analysis	for	ratings	of	perpetrating	as	an	action	choice	are	shown	in	Table	9	below.		Table	9	
Multilevel	Linear	Regression	Model	6:	Addition	of	Interaction	Terms	(Perpetration	Outcome	Only)	
	 Outcome	 Parameter	 Coeff.	 SE	 df	 t	 Sig.	(p)	Intercept	 .89***	 .19	 1264.32	 4.57	 <.001	
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Perpetrate	(A5d)																				 	
Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 -.04	 .04	 1277.92	 -.81	 .42	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)	 .09†	 .05	 1277.96	 1.75	 .08	Gender	(1	=	male,	0	=	female)	 .19	 .13	 1275.09	 1.44	 .15	Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	 .19*	 .07	 1274.19	 2.59	 .01	Parental	education	level	 -.03*	 .01	 397.03	 -2.35	 .02	Male*A2a	 .03	 .03	 1277.13	 .89	 .37	Male*A2b	 -.01	 .03	 1273.88	 -.42	 .67	A4*A2a	 .001	 .02	 1277.99	 .07	 .95	A4*A2b	 -.04*	 .02	 1273.67	 -2.20	 .03	
†p	<	.10,	*p	<	.05,	***p	<	.001	(two-tailed)		 The	negative	value	of	the	coefficient	of	the	significant	interaction	term	(A4*A2b)	indicates	that	perceived	frequency	of	bullying	changed	the	relationship	between	endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	and	rating	of	perpetration	as	an	action	choice.	Another	way	to	say	this	is	that	the	slope	of	the	relationship	between	conventional	reasoning	endorsement	and	rating	of	perpetration	changed	at	different	levels	of	perceived	bullying	prevalence.	Participants	who	perceived	smaller	amounts	of	bullying	going	on	at	their	schools	tended	to	be	increasingly	approving	of	perpetration	the	more	they	endorsed	conventional	reasoning,	whereas	participants	who	perceived	a	lot	of	bullying	going	on	tended	to	select	lower	ratings	of	perpetration	as	an	action	choice	the	more	they	endorsed	conventional	reasoning.	A	different	way	to	express	this	result	would	be	that,	when	participants	did	not	consider	the	conventional	reason	to	be	a	good	explanation	for	why	bullying	is	bad,	the	amount	of	bullying	they	perceived	made	a	difference	in	their	approval	of	joining	in	the	bullying	(with	more	perceived	bullying	associated	with	greater	approval),	but	when	they	did	consider	the	conventional	reason	to	be	a	good	one,	the	amount	of	perceived	bullying	did	not	make	as	much	difference	to	their	approval	of	joining	in.	Figure	1	illustrates	this	change	in	slopes	of	the	relationship	between	endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(SitA2b)	and	predicted	values	of	the	rating	of	perpetration	(A5d)	at	different	levels	of	perceived	bullying	prevalence	(SitA4).	
	





Outcome	 Parameter	 Coeff.	(B)	 SE	 Wald	 Sig.	(p)	 Exp(B)	Intervene	indirectly	chosen	as	best	(A6a)	
Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 -.24***	 .07	 13.60	 <.001	 .79	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)	 .35***	 .08	 17.18	 <.001	 1.41	Gender	(1	=	male,	0	=	female)	 -.63***	 .14	 19.40	 <.001	 .53	Age	in	years	 .12	 .10	 1.39	 .24	 1.13	
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Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	 -.28**	 .08	 11.74	 .001	 .75	Constant	 -2.57	 1.69	 2.32	 .13	 .08	Bystand	chosen	as	best	(A6b)	 Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 -.12†	 .07	 3.18	 .07	 .89	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)	 -.04	 .08	 .22	 .64	 .96	Gender	(1	=	male,	0	=	female)	 .58***	 .13	 18.89	 <.001	 1.78	Age	in	years	 .02	 .10	 .03	 .88	 1.02	Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	 .27**	 .08	 11.49	 .001	 1.31	Constant	 -1.88	 1.63	 1.33	 .25	 .15	Intervene	directly	chosen	as	best	(A6c)	
Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 .25***	 .06	 19.46	 <.001	 1.29	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)	 -.21**	 .07	 9.16	 .002	 .81	Gender	(1	=	male,	0	=	female)	 -.14	 .12	 1.38	 .24	 .87	Age	in	years	 -.14	 .09	 2.48	 .12	 .87	Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	 -.07	 .07	 .95	 .33	 .94	Constant	 2.28	 1.42	 2.57	 .11	 9.73	Perpetrate	chosen	as	best	(A6d)	 Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 .08	 .19	 .17	 .68	 1.08	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)	 -.13	 .22	 .36	 .55	 .88	Gender	(1	=	male,	0	=	female)	 1.37***	 .42	 10.79	 .001	 3.93	Age	in	years	 .31	 .27	 1.30	 .26	 1.37	Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	 .64**	 .22	 8.71	 .003	 1.89	Constant	 -10.92*	 4.47	 5.97	 .02	 <.001	†p	<	.10,	*p	<	.05,	**	p	<	.01,	***p	<	.001	(two-tailed)	
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participants	who	did	provide	responses	to	the	question	(A7).	In	the	second	round,	responses	were	coded	for	the	presence	or	absence	of	considerations	relating	to	each	of	the	four	SDT	domains:	moral,	conventional,	personal,	and	prudential.	In	the	third	round,	responses	were	coded	for	the	presence	or	absence	of	relational	and	emotional	considerations.	(See	Appendix	C	for	the	details	of	the	coding	guidelines	that	were	employed.)		
Interrater	reliability.	After	finalizing	the	coding	guidelines,	I	trained	a	second	coder,	who	then	coded	approximately	21%	of	the	responses	(n	=	115)	in	order	to	determine	the	interrater	reliability	of	the	coding	system.	I	compared	the	second	coder’s	codes	to	my	own	codes	for	those	115	responses	using	Cohen’s	kappa	statistic,	obtaining	a	value	of	κ	=	.87.	A	Cohen’s	kappa	value	of	at	least	.80	is	considered	a	standard	indicating	good	interrater	reliability	(Hallgren,	2012).	To	resolve	coding	disagreements	where	our	codes	differed	from	each	other,	the	second	coder	and	I	discussed	and	decided	together	on	the	final	code(s)	to	be	recorded	for	the	responses	in	question.			 Frequencies	of	considerations	cited.	In	total,	moral	considerations	were	cited	228	times	(meaning	that	moral	reasons	were	cited	in	39.6%	of	responses),	conventional	considerations	were	cited	91	times	(in	15.8%	of	responses),	personal	considerations	were	cited	103	times	(in	17.9%	of	responses),	and	prudential	considerations	were	cited	121	times	(in	21.0%	of	responses).	Besides	the	SDT	domains,	relational	considerations	were	cited	37	times	(in	6.4%	of	responses)	and	emotional	considerations	were	cited	20	times	(in	3.5%	of	responses).		These	frequencies	add	up	to	more	than	574	due	to	the	fact	that	some	participants	cited	considerations	from	more	than	a	single	category	in	their	responses.	Specifically,	487	responses	(84.8%)	contained	considerations	from	only	one	SDT	domain	and	28	(4.9%)	contained	considerations	from	two	SDT	domains,	plus	59	responses	(10.3%)	that	cited	no	SDT	domains.	With	the	relational	and	emotional	considerations	included,	474	responses	(82.6%)	referred	to	one	category	of	consideration	total,	60	responses	(10.5%)	referred	to	two	categories,	2	responses	(0.3%)	referred	to	three	categories,	and	38	responses	(6.6%)	did	not	contain	any	of	the	focal	categories	of	consideration.	Spearman	correlations	revealed	that	both	the	number	of	domains	cited	(rho	=	.18,	p	<	.001)	and	the	number	of	total	categories	cited	(rho	=	.28,	p	<	.001)	were	significantly	correlated	with	response	length.	Additionally,	though	speaking	English	as	a	first	language	was	not	significantly	associated		with	response	length	or	number	of	total	categories	cited,	it	was	actually	negatively	correlated	with	number	of	SDT	domains	cited	(rho	=	-.09,	p	=	.03).	Table	11	displays	how	many	responses	cited	each	consideration	alone	as	well	as	in	combination	with	each	other	consideration.		Table	11	
Counts	and	Percentages	of	Responses	Citing	Each	Consideration	Alone	and	in	Each	Combination	Consideration	 Moral	 Conventional	 Personal	 Prudential	 Relational	 Emotional	Moral	 193	(84.65%)	 10							(10.99%)	 6		(5.83%)	 7	(5.79%)	 6	(16.22%)	 6	(30%)	
  44 
Conventional	 10	(4.39%)	 73		(80.22%)	 0	(0%)	 4	(3.31%)	 4	(10.81%)	 0	(0%)	Personal	 6		(2.63%)	 0		(0%)	 83	(80.58%)	 1	(0.83%)	 8	(21.62%)	 5	(25%)	Prudential	 7		(3.07%)	 4	(4.40%)	 1	(0.97%)	 102	(84.30%)	 5	(13.51%)	 2	(10%)	Relational	 6	(2.63%)	 4	(4.40%)	 8	(7.77%)	 5	(4.13%)	 12	(32.43%)	 2	(10%)	Emotional	 6	(2.63%)	 0	(0%)	 5	(4.85%)	 2	(1.65%)	 2	(5.41%)	 5	(25%)	Total	 228	 91	 103	 121	 37	 20	
Note:	The	percentages	in	parentheses	represent	the	percentage	of	the	total	number	of	citations	for	the	consideration	(by	column)	that	were	cited	in	each	combination.	The	numbers	on	the	diagonal	represent	how	many	responses,	out	of	all	the	responses	that	cited	a	consideration,	cited	only	that	one	consideration.			 The	moral	domain	was	the	domain	invoked	most	frequently,	followed	by	prudential,	personal,	and	then	conventional,	with	relational	and	emotional	considerations	mentioned	much	less	frequently.	It	is	also	apparent	from	Table	11	that	the	vast	majority	of	the	citations	for	each	domain-related	consideration	were	solitary	citations	(all	>	80%).	In	other	words,	most	of	the	time,	participants	only	cited	one	SDT	domain	in	their	brief	free-response	explanations.	Relational	and	emotional	considerations,	on	the	other	hand,	were	less	often	cited	as	the	sole	consideration;	they	appeared	more	often	alongside	other	considerations.	
Examples	of	each	code	and	combination.	This	section	provides	examples	of	student	responses	that	were	coded	with	each	different	consideration,	alone	and	in	each	combination.	Responses	that	were	coded	as	only	containing	considerations	from	only	one	SDT	domain	will	be	discussed	first,	followed	by	examples	of	responses	that	cited	various	combinations	of	domain-based	considerations.	Lastly,	examples	of	the	two	non-SDT	categories	of	consideration,	relational	and	emotional,	will	be	presented.		Responses	that	referred	to	concerns	about	harm	and	welfare—physical	and/or	psychological—of	the	target	or	others	(not	the	participant	themselves),	or	to	fairness/justice,	rights,	etc.	were	coded	as	containing	a	moral	consideration.	Examples	of		responses	containing	moral	considerations	included,	“It's	not	fair	that	the	new	kid	is	being	made	fun	of,”	“Teasing	turns	school	into	a	horrible	place	for	them,	and	no	one	deserves	that,”		and	“I	would	tell	the	kids	that	it	is	not	nice	to	make	fun	of	it	and	it	really	is	hurting	the	kid's	feelings.”	Several	participants	used	language	that	was	somewhat	vague,	but	that	clearly	referred	to	a	sense	of	universal,	inherent	rightness	vs.	wrongness—and	thus	to	the	moral	domain—such	as,	“Because	I	think	that	it's	wrong	to	make	fun	of	someone	just	because	of	the	way	they	look	or	because	of	where	they	are	from,”	or	“I	would	do	this	because	it	is	not	cool	to	make	fun	of	someone	and	where	they	are	from.”	(Though	the	word	“cool”	could	refer	to	social	approval,	which	would	potentially	be	in	the	conventional	
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domain,	some	responses	that	used	“not	cool”	clearly	seemed	to	mean	it	in	the	sense	of	“not	OK”	in	a	moral	way.)	Another	subtype	of	consideration	coded	as	moral	could	be	referred	to	as	empathy-based	reasoning,	in	that	participants	extended	their	own	feelings	to	those	of	others	as	equal	human	beings.	These	Golden	Rule-following	participants	stated	that	they,	or	the	bullies,	would	not	like	to	be	treated	the	way	the	target	was	treated,	and	therefore	it	was	wrong	to	treat	someone	like	that,	such	as,	“Because	it	isn't	right	to	judge	anyone	you	don't	know	and	if	it	was	you,	you	wouldn't	like	to	be	treated	that	way,”	or	“I	don't	like	being	teased	and	so	I	imagine	the	boy	doesn't	either	so	I'd	try	and	stop	it.”	A	final	example	that	contains	at	least	two	different	types	of	moral	consideration	was,	“Why,	because	they	are	making	the	boy	feel	bad.	And	with	me	having	family	that	came	to	the	US	recently	they	shouldn't	deserve	to	be	treated	like	that”	(referring	to	both	psychological	harm	and	empathy-based	reasoning).	Responses	were	coded	as	containing	a	conventional	consideration	if	they	referred	to	the	structure	and/or	function	of	social	groups,	the	social	role	or	authority	of	certain	figures,	external	rules	or	punishments	intended	to	maintain	order,	and	other	such	concerns.	Representative	examples	included	the	following:	“The	teacher	has	more	authority,	and	he	or	she	would	know	how	to	solve	this	problem,”	“Because	hopefully	they	[teachers]	tell	the	kids	who	are	doing	the	bullying	to	stop	and	punish	them	somehow,”	and	“I	would	tell	them	[the	perpetrators]	to	stop	and	warn	them	if	they	don't	I	would	go	to	a	teacher.	Usually	if	they	will	get	in	trouble,	they	will	stop.”	Like	these	examples,	most	responses	coded	as	conventional	talked	about	teachers	as	knowing	what	to	do	and	being	more	able	to	handle	the	situation	due	to	their	social	role	and	power.	A	few	other	responses	contained	a	different	type	of	conventional	consideration,	in	which	students	seemed	concerned	with	a	social	convention	that	it	is	not	desirable	to	be	a	tattletale	or	snitch,	i.e.,	someone	who	tells	an	authority	figure	about	a	peer’s	wrongdoing.	Two	examples	of	this	were,	“because	someone	should	tell	them	that	and	not	‘tattle’	on	them”	(explaining	why	it	would	be	best	to	confront	the	bullies)	and	“So	the	teacher	can	solve	it	and	let	the	student	get	away	from	it	so	the	other	students	wouldn't	think	he	or	she	snitch”	(explaining	why	it	would	be	best	to	tell	a	teacher).	Responses	that	referenced	issues	of	individuality,	personal	preference,	and	privacy—issues	that,	participants	seemed	to	feel,	should	not	be	governed	by	either	moral	or	social-conventional	rules—were	coded	as	containing	considerations	from	the	personal	domain.	Many	examples	in	this	category	involved	participants	stating	that	the	situation	was	none	of	their	business	and/or	implying	that	becoming	involved	should	be	a	matter	of	personal	choice	(i.e.,	not	a	moral	or	social	obligation),	such	as,	“Because	I	don't	like	getting	in	people's	business,”	“I'm	not	generally	one	to	meddle	in	what	someone	else	is	doing.	I	like	to	mind	my	own	business,”	and	“Because	I	don't	like	getting	into	drama.”	Others	referred	to	their	own	personal	qualities	as	justifications	for	their	choice	of	action,	such	as,	“I'm	a	shy	person	and	I	don't	like	to	get	into	situations	that	don't	involve	me.	I	usually	just	move	on,”	“Because	I’m	outspoken	like	that,”	or	“I'm	a	very	confrontational	person.	If	someone	has	a	problem,	say	it	to	my	face.”		The	prudential	domain	category	included	references	to	the	participant’s	own	safety/welfare	or	other	practical	concerns	(for	the	participant	themselves).	Most	of	the	participants	whose	responses	contained	prudential	considerations	appeared	to	be	worried	about	getting	teased,	hurt,	or	in	trouble	if	they	were	to	intervene,	e.g.,	“Because	sometimes	when	you	get	involved	you	could	get	hurt	yourself,”	“I	would	stay	out	of	it	because	the	
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students	doing	the	teasing	would	most	likely	start	to	tease	me	instead,”	“By	staying	out	of	the	situation,	I	avoid	making	enemies	with	the	students	and	keep	them	from	focusing	their	negativity	towards	me	in	retaliation,”	or,	simply,	“I	don’t	want	to	get	in	trouble.”	A	few	other	responses	seemed	to	focus	less	on	personal	safety	and	more	on	practicality,	in	terms	of	the	probable	effects	of	potential	efforts	they	could	make,	such	as,	“It	[confronting	them]	is	the	easiest	way	and	it	will	probably	work	better	than	telling	the	teacher	on	them,”	or,	on	the	more	cynical	side,	“I	chose	b	[to	stay	out	of	it],	because	most	of	the	time	and	in	reality	you	can't	save	everyone.”	Even	with	such	short	responses,	a	number	of	participants	cited	considerations	from	more	than	one	SDT	domain.	For	instance,	the	following	response	cited	considerations	relating	to	both	punishment	(conventional)	and	the	psychological	welfare	of	the	target	(moral):	“If	I	tell	a	teacher	about	what's	going	on,	the	boys	will	be	disciplined,	and	hopefully	the	new	boy	would	feel	comfortable	enough	and	not	keep	to	himself	anymore.”	An	example	response	that	cited	both	moral	(referring	to	harm)	and	personal	(referring	to	personal	preference)	considerations	was,	“I	do	not	like	getting	in	other	people's	problems.	I	would	only	help	if	it	was	hurting	someone	physically.”	A	sample	response	combining	moral	and	prudential	concerns	was,	“I	would	not	want	to	get	myself	in	the	situation	and	get	hurt,	but	I	wouldn't	want	him	to	get	hurt	either,	so	I'd	tell	a	teacher.”	No	responses	were	coded	as	containing	both	conventional	and	personal	considerations,	but	one	that	was	coded	as	both	conventional	and	prudential	was,	“It	should	be	taken	into	adult	hands	and	others	may	not	want	to	put	themselves	in	risk,”	as	it	referred	to	both	the	conventional	role	of	adults	and	the	safety	concerns	of	witnesses	like	the	participant.	Finally,	only	one	response	seemed	to	clearly	cite	both	personal	and	prudential	concerns,	namely,	“I	normally	don't	like	bullying	people	and	I	prefer	to	stay	out	so	that	they	won't	try	to	bully	me.”	In	addition	to	voicing	concern	for	their	own	safety,	this	participant	argued	against	bullying	not	because	it	is	harmful	or	against	social	rules,	but	because	they	“normally	don’t	like”	to	do	it.		One	of	the	two	non-SDT	categories	that	was	coded	for	was	relational	considerations,	when	participants	referred	to	their	relationships	(or	lack	thereof)	with	the	target	and/or	bullies	as	an	action	choice	justification	in	itself,	separate	from	any	moral,	conventional,	personal,	or	prudential	concerns.	Though	the	majority	of	relational	considerations	were	cited	together	with	SDT	considerations,	sometimes	they	were	cited	alone	without	explicit	reference	to	any	of	the	domains,	as	in,	“If	I	know	the	kids	bullying	the	boy	I	would	say	something	but	otherwise	I	wouldn't,”	or	“	I	would	just	leave	it	alone	cause	it	aint	me	or	my	friend	or	family.”	These	and	several	other	responses	coded	as	containing	relational	considerations	appeared	to	indicate	that	the	participant	would	act	differently	depending	on	whether	they	had	an	interpersonal	relationship	with	the	involved	parties	or	not,	implying	that	different	standards	would	apply.	There	were	also	a	few	responses	that	cited	both	relational	and	other	considerations.	“Why	would	I	take	precautions	if	I	didn't	know	him?	Why	should	I	get	involved	and	create	enemies”	and	“Because	I	don't	want	the	people	teasing	the	boy	to	start	tease	me.	If	they	were	my	friends,	though,	I	would	stick	up	for	the	other	kid”	both	combined	relational	and	prudential,	though	the	first	example	referenced	relation	to	the	target,	while	the	second	example	referenced	relation	to	the	perpetrators.	An	example	of	the	combination	of	relational	and	personal	(referring	to	personal	choice/discretion)	was,	“Because	I	don't	want	to	get	involved	with	it.	I	probably	don't	even	know	the	student	who's	being	teased.	If	it	was	one	of	my	friends,	then	I	would	stand	up	for	them.”	One	response	that	was	coded	as	both	relational	and	conventional	was	the	following:	
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“Sometimes	depending	on	who	the	person	is	I	will	help	out	but	most	of	the	time	not	worry	because	some	students	need	it”;	though	the	referent	of	“it”	was	not	clear,	this	response	was	coded	as	containing	a	conventional	consideration	because	the	idea	seemed	to	be	that	some	students	“need”	either	help	(possibly	due	to	power	differentials)	or	teasing	(possibly	in	order	to	fit	in),	both	of	which	have	to	with	the	functioning	of	the	social	system	of	the	school.	Lastly,	an	example	of	the	combination	of	relational	and	moral	was,	“I	picked	[direct	intervention]	because	if	they	are	your	real	friends	they	should	respect	that	you	are	standing	up	for	another	person.”	In	addition	to	the	relational	consideration,	this	response	was	coded	as	citing	a	moral	consideration	because	it	referred	to	a	sense	of	being	owed	respect,	particularly	for	trying	to	protect	another	person.			The	final	category	of	interest	was	emotional	considerations,	conceptualized	as	occurring	when	participants	mentioned	their	own	emotional	reactions,	or	those	of	generic	others,	as	reasons	in	themselves	to	explain	their	intended	action	choice.	The	emotional	category	was	the	least-cited	overall	of	the	six	categories	of	interest,	and	three	quarters	of	all	coded	emotional	considerations	were	cited	alongside	other	categories	of	consideration,	making	this	the	category	least	often	cited	alone.	The	handful	of	responses	that	cited	emotional	considerations	alone	included,	“The	teasing	of	the	boy	would	make	me	mad	and	I'd	go	over	and	tell	them	that,“	“Even	though	its	not	the	best	choice,	I	would	be	scared	to	do	anything	about	it,”	and	“I	would	want	to	say	something	but	I	wouldn't	be	brave	enough	to	say	anything.”	Responses	citing	both	emotional	and	other	considerations	included:	“Unfortunately,	I	probably	would	be	too	scared	to	interfere,	unless	I	knew	the	people	who	were	picking	on”	(emotional	and	relational);	“Well	I	would	say	that	I	believe	in	human	rights,	but	I	might	not	have	the	courage	to	help.	Fear	can	often	be	a	big	factor”	(emotional	and	moral);	“I	can't	stand	jerks	so	I	would	tell	them	to	stop.	It	really	frustrates	me	when	people	are	rude”	(emotional	and	personal);	and	“Because	it	would	make	me	feel	bad	probably	for	a	long	time	if	I	never	said	anything”	(emotional	and	prudential,	referring	to	the	participant’s	own	emotional	well-being).			 Considerations	cited	by	action	choice	selected.	To	get	an	idea	of	how	the	considerations	cited	by	participants	in	their	free-response	explanations	(A7)	related	to	their	answers	to	the	previous	question	that	set	up	the	explanation—namely,	the	question	asking	them	to	choose	which	one	of	the	four	provided	action	choices	they	would	be	most	likely	to	take	(A6)—whether	participants	cited	each	consideration	was	cross-tabulated	by	which	action	choice	was	selected.	Table	12	below	shows	how	many	participants	cited	each	consideration	by	which	action	choice	they	selected.		Table	12	
Number	and	Percentage	of	Participants	Who	Cited	Each	Consideration,	by	Action	Choice	Selected	Action	choice	selected	 Moral	cited	 Convention-al	cited	 Personal	cited	 Prudential	cited	 Relational	cited	 Emotional	cited	 Total	Indirect	intervention	(A6a)	 38	(29.23%)	 65	(50.00%)	 4	(3.08%)	 33	(25.38%)	 2		(1.54%)	 1		(0.77%)	 130	
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Consideration		 Variable	 t	 df	 Sig.	(p)	 Mean	diff.	 SE	diff.	 ga	Moral	 Age	in	years	 -2.44*	 566	 .02	 -.14	 .06	 .21	Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	 -2.02*	 566	 .04	 -.14	 .07	 .18	Rating	of	bystanding	(A5b)	 -5.95***	 486.21	 <.001	 -.45	 .08	 .51	Rating	of	direct	intervention	(A5c)	 7.19***	 566	 <.001	 .48	 .07	 .61	Conventional	 Conven.	reasoning	endorsement	(A2b)	 2.20*	 136.12	 .03	 .20	 .09	 .24		 Rating	of	indirect	intervention	(A5a)	 5.63***	 149.91	 <.001	 .46	 .08	 .55		 Rating	of	bystanding	(A5b)	 -2.49*	 137.69	 .01	 -.24	 .10	 .26		 Rating	of	direct	intervention	(A5c)	 -1.85†	 566	 .06	 -.17	 .09	 .21	Personal	 Rating	of	indirect	intervention	(A5a)	 -3.91***	 141.90	 <.001	 -.37	 .10	 .45		 Rating	of	bystanding	(A5b)	 5.39***	 569	 <.001	 .52	 .10	 .58		 Rating	of	direct	intervention	(A5c)	 -4.05***	 566	 <.001	 -.35	 .09	 .44		 Rating	of	perpetrating	(A5d)	 3.23**	 118.06	 .002	 .24	 .07	 .20	Prudential	 Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	 2.72**	 566	 .007	 .22	 .08	 .28		 Rating	of	bystanding	(A5b)	 4.25***	 569	 <.001	 .39	 .09	 .43		 Rating	of	direct	intervention	(A5c)	 -5.16***	 566	 <.001	 -.42	 .08	 .53	Relational	 Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 2.00†	 42.78	 .05	 .31	 .15	 .30	
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Emotional	 Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 2.06†	 21.40	 .05	 .38	 .18	 .36	Age	in	years	 1.82†	 566	 .07	 .28	 .15	 .42	
Note:	Levene’s	test	for	equality	of	variances	was	used	to	determine	whether	equal	variances	could	be	assumed	between	the	two	means	for	each	variable.	If	equal	variances	could	not	be	assumed	(as	indicated	by	a	low	p	value	of	Levene’s	test),	Welch	t	Test	statistics	are	reported.	a	Hedges’	g	is	a	measure	of	effect	size	similar	to	Cohen’s	d,	but	corrected	for	when	sample	sizes	differ	between	groups;	a	general	rule	of	thumb	is	that	.2	is	considered	small	in	magnitude,	.5	is	medium,	and	.8	is	large	(Cohen,	1988).	†p	<	.10,	*p	<	.05,	**	p	<	.01,	***p	<	.001	(two-tailed)		Table	14	
Chi-Square	Tests	of	Independence	Between	Categorical	Study	Variables	and	Whether	Each	
Consideration	Was	Cited	in	Free-Response	Explanation	Consideration		 Variable	 df	 N	 χ2 Sig.	(p)	 Greatera	 φb Moral	 Gender	(1	=	male,	0	=	female)	 1	 574	 6.10*	 .01	 0	 .10		 Indirect	intervention	chosen	(A6a;	1	=	yes,	0	=	no)	 1	 574	 7.73**	 .005	 0	 .12		 Bystanding	chosen	(A6b;	1	=	yes,	0	=	no)	 1	 574	 102.53***	 <.001	 0	 .42		 Direct	intervention	chosen	(A6c;	1	=	yes,	0	=	no)	 1	 574	 134.57***	 <.001	 1	 .48	Conventional	 Indirect	intervention	chosen	(A6a;	1	=	yes,	0	=	no)	 1	 574	 146.89***	 <.001	 1	 .51		 Bystanding	chosen	(A6b)	 1	 574	 32.76***	 <.001	 0	 .24		 Direct	intervention	chosen	(A6c;	1	=	yes,	0	=	no)	 1	 574	 29.39***	 <.001	 0	 .23	Personal	 Gender	(1	=	male,	0	=	female)	 1	 574	 3.12†	 .08	 1	 .07	Indirect	intervention	chosen	(A6a;	1	=	yes,	0	=	no)	 1	 574	 25.23***	 <.001	 0	 .21	Bystanding	chosen	(A6b)	 1	 574	 91.14***	 <.001	 1	 .40	Direct	intervention	chosen	(A6c;	1	=	yes,	0	=	no)	 1	 574	 22.09***	 <.001	 0	 .20	Prudential	 Bystanding	chosen	(A6b;	1	=	yes,	0	=	no)	 1	 574	 81.64***	 <.001	 1	 .38	
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	 Direct	intervention	chosen	(A6c;	1	=	yes,	0	=	no)	 1	 574	 79.09***	 <.001	 0	 .37	Relational		 Indirect	intervention	chosen	(A6a;	1	=	yes,	0	=	no)	 1	 574	 6.71*	 .01	 0	 .11	Emotional	 Indirect	intervention	chosen	(A6a;	1	=	yes,	0	=	no)	 1	 574	 3.68†	 .06	 0	 .08		 Direct	intervention	chosen	(A6c;	1	=	yes,	0	=	no)	 1	 574	 3.61†	 .06	 1	 .08	
a	This	column	indicates	at	which	value	of	the	categorical	variable	(1	or	0)	the	proportion	who	cited	the	consideration	was	significantly	greater,	as	determined	from	crosstabulation	tables.		 b	φ	(phi)	is	a	measure	of	effect	size	for	chi-square	tests,	for	which,	generally,	.1	is	considered	a	small	effect	size,	.3	is	medium,	and	.5	is	large	(Cohen,	1988).		†p	<	.10,	*p	<	.05,	**	p	<	.01,	***p	<	.001	(two-tailed)			 Participants	who	cited	moral	considerations	in	their	explanations,	as	compared	to	those	who	did	not,	were	younger,	more	likely	to	be	female,	and	perceived	less	bullying	at	their	school.	They	did	not	differ	in	reasoning	endorsement,	but	rated	direct	intervention	more	highly	and	rated	indirect	intervention	and	bystanding	less	highly;	correspondingly,	they	were	more	likely	to	choose	direct	intervention	as	their	most	likely	action	choice,	and	less	likely	to	choose	indirect	intervention	or	bystanding.		Participants	who	cited	conventional	considerations	scored	higher	on	conventional	reasoning	endorsement	compared	to	those	who	did	not.	They	also	rated	indirect	intervention	as	better	and	both	direct	intervention	(marginally)	and	bystanding	as	worse.	In	parallel	to	this,	they	were	more	likely	to	choose	indirect	intervention	and	less	likely	to	choose	either	bystanding	or	direct	intervention.		 Participants	who	cited	personal	considerations	were	(marginally)	more	often	male,	and	tended	to	rate	both	positive	action	choices	less	highly	and	both	negative	action	choices	more	highly;	likewise,	they	more	often	chose	bystanding	and	less	often	chose	direct	or	indirect	intervention.		 Compared	to	others,	participants	who	cited	prudential	considerations	perceived	greater	prevalence	of	bullying	at	their	schools.	They	were	more	approving	of	bystanding	and	were	more	likely	to	choose	it;	on	the	other	hand,	they	were	less	approving	of	direct	intervention	and	less	likely	to	select	it	as	their	“best”	action	choice.		 If	participants	cited	relational	considerations,	they	tended	to	score	marginally	higher	on	endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	and	were	significantly	less	likely	to	select	the	action	choice	of	indirect	intervention.		Finally,	participants	who	mentioned	emotional	considerations,	compared	to	those	who	did	not,	were	marginally	older,	marginally	more	endorsing	of	moral	reasoning,	and	marginally	more	likely	to	choose	direct	intervention,	as	well	as	marginally	less	likely	to	choose	indirect	intervention.		







	 Outcome	 Parameter	 Coeff.	 SE	 df	 t	 Sig.	(p)	Social	perspective-taking	competence	(SPT-IM)	
Intercept	 2.83***	 .28	 709.93	 10.04	 <.001	Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 .05***	 .01	 1157.75	 5.37	 <.001	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)	 .01	 .01	 1157.35	 1.26	 .21	Gender	(1	=	male,	0	=	female)	 -.17***	 .02	 1157.88	 -8.25	 <.001	Age	in	years	 .01	 .02	 630.14	 .81	 .42	Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	 -.01	 .01	 1136.88	 -.78	 .44	Parental	education	level	 .02*	 .01	 1033.55	 2.09	 .04	
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	 Dependent	Variable:	Rating	of	Indirect	Intervention	(A5a)	Direct	effects		 Parameter	 Coeff.	 SE	 t	 Sig.	(p)	Constant	 1.52***	 .25	 6.08	 <.001	Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 -.06**	 .02	 -2.54	 .01	
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Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)	 .20***	 .03	 7.24	 <.001	Gender	(1	=	male,	0	=	female)	 -.33***	 .05	 -6.91	 <.001	Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	 -.09***	 .03	 -3.28	 <.001	Parental	education	level	 .003	 .02	 .15	 .88	Social	perspective-taking	competence	(SPT-IM)	 .37***	 .07	 5.43	 <.001	Indirect	effects	 Parameter	 Effect	 SE	 LLCIa	 ULCIb	Social	perspective-taking	competence	(SPT-IM)	 .02	 .006	 .010	 .032	Dependent	Variable:	Rating	of	Bystanding	(A5b)	Direct	effects		 Parameter	 Coeff.	 SE	 t	 Sig.	(p)	Constant	 3.13***	 .28	 11.33	 <.001	Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 -.06*	 .03	 -2.37	 .02	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)	 .03	 .03	 1.00	 .32	Gender	(1	=	male,	0	=	female)	 .13*	 .05	 2.46	 .01	Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	 .15*	 .03	 4.94	 <.001	Parental	education	level	 -.01	 .02	 -.39	 .70	Social	perspective-taking	competence	(SPT-IM)	 -.35***	 .08	 -4.65	 <.001	Indirect	effects	 Parameter	 Effect	 SE	 LLCIa	 ULCIb	Social	perspective-taking	competence	(SPT-IM)	 -.02	 .006	 -.031	 -.009	Dependent	Variable:	Rating	of	Direct	Intervention	(A5c)	Direct	effects	 Parameter	 Coeff.	 SE	 t	 Sig.	(p)	Constant	 2.64***	 .25	 10.76	 <.001	
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Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 .08***	 .02	 3.42	 <.001	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)	 .02	 .03	 .84	 .40	Gender	(1	=	male,	0	=	female)	 -.15**	 .05	 -3.19	 .002	Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	 -.08**	 .03	 -3.06	 .002	Parental	education	level	 .01	 .02	 .53	 .59	Social	perspective-taking	competence	(SPT-IM)	 .13*	 .07	 2.04	 .04	Indirect	effects	 Parameter	 Effect	 SE	 LLCIa	 ULCIb	Social	perspective-taking	competence	(SPT-IM)	 .01	 .004	 -.0002	 .016	Dependent	Variable:	Rating	of	Perpetration	(A5d)	Direct	effects		 Parameter	 Coeff.	 SE	 t	 Sig.	(p)	Constant	 2.20***	 .16	 13.75	 <.001	Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 .001	 .01	 .05	 .96	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)	 -.008	 .02	 -.46	 .65	Gender	(1	=	male,	0	=	female)	 .16***	 .03	 5.35	 <.001	Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	 .06***	 .02	 3.57	 <.001	Parental	education	level	 -.04**	 .01	 -3.05	 .002	Social	perspective-taking	competence	(SPT-IM)	 -.33***	 .04	 -7.60	 <.001	Indirect	effects	 Parameter	 Effect	 SE	 LLCIa	 ULCIb	Social	perspective-taking	competence	(SPT-IM)	 -.02	 .005	 -.028	 -.010	aLLCI	=	lower	limit	of	95%	confidence	interval;	bULCI	=	upper	limit	of	95%	confidence	interval		*p	<	.05,	**	p	<	.01,	***p	<	.001	(two-tailed)		
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For	the	first	mediation	analysis,	with	ratings	of	indirect	intervention	(A5a)	as	the	dependent	variable,	the	overall	model	was	significant,	F(6,	1170)	=	29.16,	p	<	.001,	and	explained	about	13%	of	the	variance	in	the	rating	of	indirect	intervention	as	an	action	choice.	In	this	model,	endorsement	of	moral	reasoning,	along	with	being	male	and	perceiving	more	bullying	happening	at	school,	were	related	to	significantly	lower	ratings	of	indirect	intervention	as	an	action	choice.	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	was	related	to	significantly	higher	ratings,	and	parental	education	level	did	not	have	a	significant	direct	effect.	SPT-IM	score	showed	a	positive	direct	effect	on	ratings	of	indirect	intervention	as	well	as	a	significant	positive	indirect	effect	(between	moral	reasoning	and	action	choice),	as	indicated	by	the	95%	confidence	interval	that	did	not	include	zero;	this	indicates	that	the	effect	of	moral	reasoning	on	indirect	intervention	rating	was	significantly	mediated	by	social	perspective-taking	competence.		 The	second	mediation	analysis	used	ratings	of	bystanding	(A5b)	as	the	action	choice	dependent	variable.	The	total	model	was	significant,	F(6,1171)	=	12.94,	p	<	.001,	and	explained	about	6%	of	variance	in	ratings	of	bystanding.	Male	participants	and	those	who	perceived	greater	bullying	prevalence	tended	to	rate	bystanding	significantly	higher,	while	endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	and	SPT-IM	score	were	associated	with	lower	ratings	of	bystanding.	Neither	conventional	reasoning	endorsement	nor	parental	education	level	had	a	significant	direct	effect.	The	indirect	effect	of	moral	reasoning	on	bystanding	through	SPT-IM	score	was	significant	(negative),	meaning	that	social	perspective-taking	competence	significantly	mediated	the	negative	relationship	of	moral	reasoning	to	ratings	of	bystanding.			 The	dependent	variable	for	the	third	model	was	ratings	of	direct	intervention	as	an	action	choice	(A5c).	The	model	was	significant,	F(6,	1171)	=	8.18,	and	explained	about	4%	of	variance.	In	terms	of	direct	effects	on	ratings	of	direct	intervention,	endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	and	SPT-IM	score	had	significant	positive	effects,	endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	and	parental	education	level	had	no	effects,	and	gender	(male)	and	perceived	bullying	prevalence	had	significant	negative	effects.		The	95%	confidence	interval	for	the	indirect	effect	of	moral	reasoning	through	SPT-IM	did	include	zero,	indicating	that	significant	mediation	by	SPT-IM	did	not	occur	in	relation	to	direct	intervention	ratings.		 The	fourth	model,	with	ratings	of	perpetrating	bullying	as	the	action	choice	dependent	variable	(A5d),	was	significant	overall,	F(6,	1173)	=	24.27,	p	<	.001.	This	model	explained	about	11%	of	the	variance	in	ratings	of	perpetrating.	Neither	moral	nor	conventional	reasoning	showed	a	significant	direct	effect	on	this	outcome,	but	males	and	those	who	perceived	more	bullying	at	school	tended	to	rate	perpetrating	more	highly,	while	those	with	higher	SPT-IM	scores	and	more	highly-educated	parents	gave	it	lower	ratings.	There	was	also	a	significant	negative	indirect	effect	of	moral	reasoning	endorsement	through	SPT-IM.	This	significant	indirect	effect,	in	combination	with	the	nonsignificant	direct	effect	of	moral	reasoning,	implies	that	any	effects	of	moral	reasoning	on	ratings	of	perpetrating	were	at	least	partially	mediated	by	social	perspective-taking	competence.	
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free-response	explanations	for	their	intended	action	choices,	I	began	by	coding	all	of	the	responses	(from	the	subset	of	participants	who	provided	them)	using	a	domain-based	framework.	I	then	tabulated	the	categories	cited	by	which	action	choice	had	been	selected	and	compared	means	of	study	variables	between	those	who	had	cited	a	given	consideration	and	those	who	had	not.		The	first	finding	was	that	all	the	categories,	particularly	considerations	related	to	the	four	SDT	domains,	were	well-represented	in	terms	of	citations.	Considerations	related	to	the	moral	domain	were	the	most	commonly	cited	by	a	large	margin,	supporting	the	contention	that	students	do	tend	to	view	issues	of	bullying	and	bystander	intervention	as	morally-relevant	issues.	Only	about	10%	of	responses	did	not	refer	to	any	domain-based	considerations,	which	strongly	suggests	that	SDT	was	a	viable	interpretive	framework	even	when	responses	were	limited	to	three	lines	and	questions	were	not	specifically	designed	to	elicit	domain-based	reasoning.	Though	most	domain	considerations	were	cited	alone,	i.e.,	as	the	only	consideration	in	the	response,	the	fact	that	responses	were	so	constrained	in	terms	of	length	limits	the	conclusions	that	can	be	drawn.	Most	students	may	not	have	spontaneously	demonstrated	multi-domain	coordination	simply	because	the	survey	form	suggested	such	brief	responses.	The	non-SDT	categories,	relational	and	emotional	considerations,	were	cited	less	often	overall	than	domain	considerations	and	were	less	likely	to	be	cited	alone,	though	each	was	cited	as	the	sole	consideration	several	times.	When	the	number	of	responses	citing	each	category	of	consideration	was	cross-tabulated	with	which	intended	action	choice	participants	selected	(as	the	one	they	would	be	most	likely	to	take),	similar	patterns	emerged	as	those	found	in	research	question	1.	For	instance,	moral	was	the	most-cited	category	by	those	who	selected	direct	intervention	(64%	of	responses	in	this	group	mentioned	moral	considerations),	while	half	of	those	who	selected	indirect	intervention	cited	conventional	reasoning.	The	content	of	these	responses	showed	that	the	cited	considerations	did	tend	to	correspond	with	the	chosen	mechanism	of	action.	For	instance,	most	of	the	moral	citations	reflected	concerns	with	harm	to	the	target,	fairness,	and	empathy	(similar	in	principle	to	the	Golden	Rule),	while	the	majority	of	conventional	citations	had	to	do	with	the	social	role	and	authority	of	teachers.	The	novel	contribution	of	this	analysis,	as	compared	with	RQ1,	was	that	personal	and	prudential	reasoning	could	be	examined	as	well	due	to	the	open-ended	nature	of	the	question.	In	line	with	study	hypotheses,	most	of	the	students	who	selected	bystanding	cited	personal	(43%)	and	prudential	(47%)	considerations.	Similar	to	what	has	been	found	in	other	studies	of	adolescent	bystanding	behavior	(i.e.,	non-action	in	response	to	witnessing	the	harassment	of	others;	see	Edwards,	Rodenhizer-Stämpfli,	&	Eckstein,	2015),	students	who	selected	bystanding	tended	to	cite	personal	safety	concerns	(prudential)	and	the	belief	that	others’	conflicts	were	“not	their	business”	(personal).		Though	few	students	in	this	subsample	chose	perpetrating	as	the	“best”	choice	in	the	situation,	those	who	did	cited	personal	and	conventional	citations	most	often.	One	particularly	striking	explanation	by	a	student	who	selected	perpetration	stated,	“I	would	make	fun	of	him	we	students	don't	‘bully’	him	-	making	fun	of	[him]	is	the	new	kind	of	respect	we	accept	him.”	This	response	seems	to	indicate	that	this	student	viewed	teasing	not	as	harmful	bullying,	but	as	a	social	convention	that	signifies	respect	and	acceptance.	Other	explanations	for	choosing	to	join	in	on	perpetration	included,	“I	think	if	I	don’t	start	teasing	the	person	they	will	start	with	me”	(coded	as	prudential),	as	well	as	“Because	I	like	to	join	in	because	it	is	a	fun	thing	to	do,”	“I’m	not	a	nice	person,”	and	“That	just	who	I	am”	
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(all	coded	as	personal).	These	types	of	responses	were	rare,	however.	In	fact,	though	it	is	impossible	to	know	for	sure,	a	few	of	the	free-response	explanations	by	students	who	selected	perpetrating	seemed	mismatched	with	that	action	choice	(e.g.,	responses	that	explicitly	referenced	telling	a	teacher	or	telling	the	perpetrators	to	stop),	implying	that	these	students	might	have	chosen	perpetrating	by	accident	or	misunderstood	the	question.	The	largest	number	of	relational	citations	were	found	when	direct	intervention	was	selected,	followed	by	bystanding;	an	examination	of	these	responses	indicates	that	students	who	used	relational	considerations	to	explain	the	choice	to	bystand	were	often	referring	to	relational	concerns	in	the	negative	(e.g.,	if	none	of	the	involved	parties	were	my	friends,	I	would	stay	out	of	it).	Emotional	considerations	were	most	often	cited	to	explain	the	choice	to	directly	intervene,	usually	with	the	sense	that	strong	emotions	would	propel	the	participant	towards	action.	Though	not	conclusive,	this	pattern	suggests	support	for	the	model	proposed	by	Arsenio	and	Lemerise	(2004),	in	which	emotions	play	an	integral	part	in	the	type	of	social	information	processing	that	translates	reasoned	socio-moral	standards	into	action.	Finally,	the	comparison	of	means	of	study	variables	by	whether	each	consideration	was	cited	in	the	free	response	yielded	several	notable	patterns	of	results.	Concordant	with	the	analyses	under	RQ1,	those	who	cited	moral	considerations	were	less	likely	male	and	perceived	less	bullying	at	their	schools;	they	were	also	significantly	younger	(in	one	of	the	few	significant	associations	found	with	age).	They	were	more	apt	to	approve	of	or	choose	direct	intervention	and	less	likely	to	do	the	same	for	bystanding.	Interestingly,	however,	they	did	not	endorse	the	moral	reasoning	justification	significantly	more	than	participants	who	did	not	cite	moral	considerations	in	their	free-response	explanations.	One	speculation	about	this	could	be	that	the	variety	of	moral	considerations	that	students	could	come	up	with	might	be	much	broader	than	the	particular	consideration	in	the	earlier	question	(that	of	bullying	being	hurtful	to	the	target).	When	participants	cited	conventional	considerations,	however,	they	did	tend	to	have	endorsed	the	conventional	justification	(about	bullying	being	against	the	rules)	more	than	others	did.	As	in	previous	analyses,	these	participants	(i.e.,	those	who	cited	conventional	considerations)	were	inclined	towards	indirect	intervention	and	away	from	both	bystanding	and	direct	intervention	as	action	choices.	Also	similar	to	previous	analyses	and	the	study	hypotheses,	those	who	cited	personal	considerations	gave	relatively	higher	ratings	to	the	negative	actions	(bystanding	and	perpetrating)	and	lower	ratings	to	both	types	of	intervention.	Students	who	cited	prudential	concerns	perceived	significantly	higher	levels	of	bullying	at	their	schools,	which	perhaps	desensitized	them	to	the	effects	of	bullying	on	targets	and/or	sensitized	them	to	the	futility	and	potential	dangers	of	intervening;	for	these	or	other	reasons,	they	were	more	likely	to	say	they	would	bystand	and	less	likely	to	say	they	would	directly	intervene.	They	did	not,	however,	significantly	differ	from	others	in	terms	of	socio-moral	reasoning	endorsements.	This	implies	that	contextual	factors,	not	necessarily	differences	in	socio-moral	reasoning,	were	behind	their	propensity	to	bystand.	The	last	two	categories	of	consideration,	relational	and	emotional,	were	both	only	significantly	related	to	a	lower	likelihood	of	choosing	indirect	intervention.	It	is	not	clear	from	these	data	why	this	was	the	case,	but	it	seems	plausible	that	students	for	whom	relational	and	emotional	concerns	were	seemingly	more	salient	(and	therefore	mentioned	in	their	free	responses)	would	find	the	prospect	of	going	and	telling	a	teacher	less	appealing	than	the	other	action	options,	which	were	all	more	focused	on	relating	to	peers	
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this	one	scenario—namely,	witnessing	verbal	harassment	of	a	new	classmate	who	is	from	another	country—that	would	not	generalize	even	to	other	hypothetical	situations	of	witnessing	bullying,	and	even	less	so	to	other	situations	(hypothetical	or	real)	involving	moral	reasoning,	social	perspective-taking,	and	action.	Moreover,	the	target	in	the	scenario	was	described	as	male	for	all	participants,	and	it	is	unknown	how	gender	dynamics	might	have	affected	participants’	responses.	To	improve	generalizability,	future	studies	in	this	vein	should	utilize	scenarios	based	on	different	types	of	situations	in	which	bullying,	bystanding,	and	other	behaviors	of	interest	tend	to	occur—and	with	different	types	of	targets—and	compare	results	with	those	found	here.		On	the	subject	of	using	hypothetical	scenarios,	another	limitation	of	this	study	was	that	it	only	collected	data	on	intended	or	anticipated	action,	not	actual	action.	Of	course,	it	is	possible	that	certain	adolescents’	actual	behavior	would	align	well	with	their	self-reported	anticipated/intended	action	choices—in	fact,	some	studies	have	found	that	intended	and	actual	actions	with	regards	to	bullying	do	significantly	correspond	(e.g.,	Heirman	&	Walrave,	2012)—but	the	reverse	possibility	is	also	likely.	In	other	words,	what	adolescents	say	they	would	do	in	response	to	morally	relevant	situations	like	witnessing	bullying	might	turn	out	to	be	quite	different	from	what	they	actually	have	done	or	would	do.	Future	studies	should	compare	survey	answers	about	hypothetical	actions	to	actual	actions,	whether	self-reported	(e.g.,	retrospectively)	or	triangulated	from	other	sources	such	as	disciplinary	records,	peer	nominations,	teacher	reports,	direct	observations,	etc.	Because	each	of	these	methods	has	weaknesses,	multi-method	assessment	is	recommended,	as	it	is	in	most	cases	of	social-emotional/moral	functioning	(Humphrey	et	al.,	2011;	McKown,	2015).	Another	potential	option	would	be	to	use	a	simulated/virtual	environment	for	assessment,	such	as	the	Virtual	Environment	for	Social	Information	Processing	(VESIP;	Russo-Ponsaran	et	al.,	2018;	Shapiro,	Accomazzo,	Claassen,	&	Robitaille,	2015).	Such	an	environment	might	feel	more	“real”	than	a	written	hypothetical	scenario,	but	would	still	enable	access	to	the	participant’s	inner	thoughts,	reasoning,	feelings,	etc.,	which	cannot	be	assessed	by	non-self-report	means.		Additionally,	to	strengthen	the	probability	that	studies	focused	on	intended	action	will	correspond	with	future	real-life	action,	future	research	should	consider	including	a	measure	of	self-efficacy,	particularly	self-efficacy	related	to	the	action	in	question.	Previous	research	on	bystander	behavior	among	young	people	has	provided	evidence	that	self-efficacy	(i.e.,	confidence	with	regards	to	intervening)	is	a	key	component	that	functions	alongside	behavioral	intentions	to	produce	intervention	behavior	(McMahon	et	al.,	2015;	Pozzoli	&	Gini,	2013).	In	other	words,	one	of	the	reasons	why	behavioral	intentions	and	behavioral	outcomes	are	not	always	aligned	is	that	young	people	may	not	have	the	self-efficacy,	i.e.,	confidence	in	themselves,	needed	to	motivate	themselves	to	take	the	actions	that	they	intend	to	take.		With	regards	to	the	design	of	the	focal	surveys	themselves,	the	free-response	question	on	the	CICM	(A7)	provided	student	participants	with	very	little	space,	which	limited	their	answers	in	length.	Although	this	probably	helped	make	the	survey	packet	more	time-efficient,	it	would	be	useful	to	see	what	participants	would	write	if	they	were	given	more	space	to	explain	their	decisions	(and	encouraged	to	use	it).	Also,	when	they	were	asked	to	explain	why	they	chose	the	action	choice	they	did,	participants	may	have	been	inspired	or	biased	by	the	options	already	presented	to	them	in	the	same	survey	(namely,	the	four	reasoning	justifications	given	in	question	A2),	and	thus	the	free	
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responses	may	be	different	than	what	they	would	have	been	if	this	type	of	question	had	been	the	only	mode	of	response	(i.e.,	if	participants	had	not	already	been	offered	reasoning	options	to	rate).	Additionally,	perhaps	because	of	time	constraints	or	higher	task	demand,	more	than	half	of	participants	did	not	fill	out	the	free-response	question,	which	does	again	limit	the	generalizability	of	these	results.	Future	research	using	free-response	questions	of	this	nature	might	consider	placing	the	free-response	question	first,	before	asking	the	participants	to	rate	different	(provided)	options	of	responses,	as	well	as	giving	more	space	and	time	in	which	to	answer.	A	further	methodological	issue	arose	with	the	coding	procedure.	When	coding	the	free	responses	(A7),	both	coders	were	blind	to	all	of	the	participants’	other	responses	except	for	their	answers	to	A6,	their	selection	of	a	“best”	action	choice;	this	information	was	included	in	the	coding	process	because	the	free	response	question	(A7)	was	phrased	as	a	request	for	explanation	of	the	choice	selected	in	A6,	so	it	seemed	to	make	sense	to	include	the	two	responses	together.	While	this	may	have	increased	the	interpretability	of	some	of	the	free	responses,	it	may	have	also	introduced	bias	into	the	coding	by	priming	coders	to	interpret	responses	a	certain	way.	The	fact	that	the	second	coder	was	blind	to	the	study	hypotheses	reduces	but	does	not	completely	mitigate	this	concern.	Future	work	should	assess	reliability	of	this	coding	system	with	none	of	the	participants’	other	responses	included	for	context.	Another	concern	with	the	measures	used	here	was	that	the	RelQ-A	was	created	for	this	research	project	as	an	adapted	version	of	an	existing	scale,	meaning	that	this	exact	scale	had	not	been	validated	before,	and	the	results	cannot	be	directly	compared	to	those	of	other	studies.	Furthermore,	the	Interpersonal	Management	subscale	did	not	meet	the	conventional	threshold	for	scale	internal	reliability	(although	it	had	the	highest	reliability	of	all	the	subscales).	Thus,	the	results	involving	scores	on	this	subscale	must	be	taken	with	caution,	as	the	extent	to	which	the	items	actually	tap	into	a	single,	internally	consistent	psychological	construct	may	be	questionable	(i.e.,	one	item	may	not	be	sufficiently	related	to	others,	or	the	subscale	may	actually	be	capturing	a	multidimensional	construct).	Though	the	small	number	of	items	in	the	subscale	likely	lowered	the	alpha	value	(Cortina,	2003),	it	should	be	noted	that	Nunnally	(1978)	originally	suggested	.70	as	an	adequate	alpha	only	for	the	early	stages	of	research	with	an	instrument,	with	alphas	of	at	least	.80	suggested	for	applied	research	(as	cited	in	Lance	et	al.,	2006).	It	would	be	interesting	if	this	scale	(RelQ-A)	and	subscale	(IM)	could	be	refined	in	the	future	such	that	they	would	be	able	to	demonstrate	more	adequate	internal	reliability.	In	the	meantime,	it	would	be	useful	for	future	studies	to	explore	relations	between	socio-moral	reasoning	and	perspective-taking	(and/or	other	social-emotional	skills)	using	other	measures	that	have	been	validated	and	show	more	robust	reliability.	One	option	would	be	to	use	a	measure	of	social	perspective-taking	that	allows	for	separation	of	potentially	different	dimensions,	such	as	the	ability	to	perspective-take	accurately	vs.	the	propensity	to	engage	in	it	(e.g.,	Gehlbach,	2004).		Similar	results	using	such	measures	would	corroborate	both	these	findings	and	the	refinement	and	use	of	the	IM	subscale	in	further	research.	Furthermore,	since	this	study	was	cross-sectional,	with	data	from	students	collected	at	only	one	time	point,	no	claims	about	causality	or	time-ordering	of	psychological	processes	(e.g.,	socio-moral	reasoning	vs.	social	perspective	taking)	can	be	made.	In	terms	of	the	relationship	between	socio-moral	reasoning	and	social	perspective-taking	competence,	it	would	be	interesting	to	conduct	a	longitudinal	study	that	would	allow	for	cross-lagged	relationships	between	the	two.	This	
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would	provide	insight	into	whether	changes	in	one	appear	to	precede	or	follow	changes	in	the	other.		Another	consideration	that	must	be	mentioned	is	that	the	overall	proportion	of	variance	in	intended	action	explained	by	the	variables	included	in	this	study	was	relatively	low	in	all	analyses.	This	indicates	that	there	were	important	factors	influencing	adolescents’	choice	of	intended	action	that	were	not	captured	by	the	variables	in	this	study.	Thus,	future	research	should	attempt	to	account	for	a	greater	share	of	potential	predictors.	In	addition	to	self-efficacy,	as	mentioned	above,	potential	predictors	could	include	teacher-	or	classroom-level	variables,	which	have	been	found	to	be	influential	in	students’	attitudes	towards	bullying	and	intervention	(Pozzoli	et	al,	2012).	In	fact,	the	larger	NPDEP	project	also	included	student-report	scales	measuring	their	perceptions	of	classroom-level	factors	such	as	classroom	climate	and	teacher	practices,	as	well	as	several	teacher-reported	measures,	including	an	assessment	of	their	own	self-efficacy	in	guiding	students’	social	and	ethical	development.	Further	work	with	the	larger	dataset	should	explore	other	variables	such	as	these	in	conjunction	with	the	variables	used	in	this	study.	Such	work	could	provide	a	fuller	picture	of	how	students’	socio-moral	reasoning,	social	perspective-taking	competence,	and	intended	action	in	challenging	situations	at	school	might	relate	to	their	classroom	contexts.	A	related	limitation	is	that	this	study	did	not	analyze	data	clustered	at	the	classroom	level,	only	at	the	school	level;	although	these	levels	were	the	same	for	the	majority	of	schools	(which	had	only	one	participating	classroom/teacher	per	school),	for	schools	that	did	have	more	than	one	participating	classroom,	this	may	have	underestimated	the	contribution	of	classroom-level	factors	to	the	observed	variance,	and	future	work	should	incorporate	both	levels	if	possible.		With	regards	to	the	sample	used	in	this	study	and	the	information	available	about	the	participants,	several	limitations	and	avenues	for	future	research	arise.	For	one,	the	age	range	in	this	study,	of	only	two	school	grades,	was	likely	too	narrow	to	detect	developmental	differences	in	the	target	variables.	Future	studies	should	include	a	broader	age	range	in	order	to	clarify	any	developmental	changes	that	may	occur	in	young	people’s	perceptions	of	bullying,	bystanding,	and	related	socio-moral	cognitions.	Another	issue	is	that	it	was	not	within	the	scope	of	this	study	to	more	deeply	investigate	differences	that	were	found	by	race/ethnicity,	especially	due	to	the	limited	nature	of	the	data	and	inability	to	ask	follow-up	questions.	Future	work	should	both	attempt	to	see	if	the	findings	reported	here	can	be	replicated	and,	if	so,	explore	potential	reasons	for	the	findings,	such	as	discrepant	experiences	with	and/or	perceptions	of	school	discipline	systems.		Additionally,	information	about	the	immigration	status	of	the	students	and/or	their	families	(e.g.,	whether	they	were	born	in	the	United	States)	was	not	collected.	Such	data	might	have	been	particularly	relevant	and	conceptually	interesting	in	this	study,	as	the	subject	matter	of	the	hypothetical	situation	was	bullying	based	on	the	“foreignness”	of	the	target.	Future	research	using	this	type	of	situation	should	consider	attempting	to	obtain	such	data,	while	taking	into	account	that	this	information	can	be	sensitive.	Following	on	that,	and	as	a	final	point,	the	data	used	in	this	study	were	collected	about	a	decade	ago,	and	different	results	might	be	obtained	if	new	data	were	to	be	collected	now.	This	is	especially	possible	due	to	the	current	political	climate	of	the	United	States,	which	unfortunately	seems	to	have	led	to	increased	levels	of	harassment	and	bullying	among	school-aged	students,	particularly	based	on	immigration	status,	foreign	origin,	and	other	aspects	of	perceived	difference	(Huang	&	Cornell,	2019;	Southern	Poverty	Law	Center,	2016).	Though	
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In	contrast,	focusing	on	rules	against	bullying,	the	potential	to	get	in	trouble	for	bullying,	etc.	may	be	better	than	nothing,	but	it	also	may	promote	an	inclination	by	students	to	get	teachers	involved	in	bullying	incidents	rather	than	stepping	in	to	try	to	disrupt	the	incidents	directly.	Informing	teachers	is	not	necessarily	a	negative	course	of	action;	in	fact,	it	may	be	one	of	the	more	desirable	and	effective	ones,	especially	if	the	school	social-emotional	climate/context	is	such	that	it	might	be	dangerous	for	students	to	get	directly	involved	(if	there	are	issues	with	gangs,	as	one	example).	However,	in	other	cases,	it	may	be	preferable	to	encourage	students	to	be	“upstanders”	and	intervene	themselves.	For	instance,	in	some	situations,	direct	intervention	by	students	could	halt	the	escalation	of	the	situation	more	quickly	and	prevent	reliance	on	over-burdened	teachers	or	other	staff	to	intervene.	Also,	as	several	participants	in	this	study	stated	in	their	free-response	explanations,	intervening	directly	might	sometimes	be	more	efficacious	because	some	adolescents	would	be	more	likely	to	take	the	judgments	of	peers	into	account	as	compared	to	the	judgments	of	teachers	and	other	adults.	Direct	intervention	by	other	students	could	also	convey	to	the	target	that	they	are	supported—and	to	perpetrating	students,	as	well	as	other	bystanders,	that	certain	kinds	of	behavior	are	socially	unacceptable.	In	this	way,	even	students	who	consider	bullying	and/or	bystanding	a	social	convention	or	norm	could	become	more	responsive	to	anti-bullying	messages.	Finally,	educators	or	others	who	hold	the	goal	of	promoting	bystander	intervention	among	youth	should	be	cognizant	of	the	various	factors	that	may	play	into	students’	decisions	to	intervene	or	not,	particularly	concerns	about	their	own	safety,	physical	or	psychological	(e.g.,	becoming	targets	of	bullying	themselves).	There	may	be	other	influential	factors	as	well,	such	as	students’	feeling	like	their	personal	characteristics	are	not	well-suited	to	intervene	(e.g.,	that	they	are	shy	and	quiet)	or	that	bullying	of	classmates—especially	those	they	don’t	know	well—is	not	their	business	(which	could	be	interpreted	as,	or	related	to,	a	lack	of	empathy).	Social	and	emotional	learning	(SEL),	which	aims	to	strengthen	self-	and	other-oriented	social	and	emotional	skills	in	every	student,	could	be	one	way	to	address	some	of	these	factors	(Divecha	&	Brackett,	2019).	Thus,	the	combination	of	SEL	with	a	domain-based	moral	education	approach	could	be	an	organic	and	holistic	way	to	both	prevent	bullying	and	promote	upstanding.		
	 	























































Situation A   
 
A student sees a group of his friends teasing a boy whose family recently arrived in the U.S. from 
another country. They are making fun of the way he speaks and telling him he should move back to 
his own country. The student who sees this wonders what to do. He decides not to say anything. 
Instead, he walks away from the group. 
 
1. How much do you agree that walking away is the best thing for him to do? (Check only one) 
  Strongly disagree □                Disagree □                  Agree □                   Strongly agree □ 
 
 
2.   Here are some of the reasons other people gave for why they think the boy should not have 
walked away but instead should have told his friends not to disrespect the boy.  How would 
you rate each of the following reasons? 
 
Reasons (Check for each row)     
(You may check the same rating more than once) Very bad Bad Good Very good 
a. Teasing is hurting the new boy. □	 □	 □	 □	
a. There is a school rule against this behavior. □	 □	 □	 □	
a. Saying something now might help other 
students feel that they can speak out in these 
situations. 
□	 □	 □	 □	
a. The new boy should know he is not alone. □	 □	 □	 □	
 
 
3. Which one of these reasons do you think is best? (Check only one):    
  a □                b □                  c □                   d □ 
 
 
4. How often does this kind of bullying happen in your school?  (Check only one) 
  Very rarely □              Rarely □                  Often □            Very often □ 
 
 
5.   If you saw this situation in your school, how would you rate each of the following actions 
you might take? 
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Actions (Check one for each row) 
(You may check the same rating more than once) Very bad Bad Good Very good 
a. Tell a teacher what was going on. □	 □	 □	 □	
a. Just stay out of it. □	 □	 □	 □	
a. Tell the students to stop being such jerks. □	 □	 □	 □	
a. Go over and join in making fun of the new 
boy. □	 □	 □	 □	
 
 
6.  Which one of these four actions (a, b, c, or d) would you be most likely to take?    
  a □                b □                  c □                   d □ 
 
 
      Please explain why:__________________________________________________________ 
      __________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
					 	






Note. Only three questions—questions 3, 4, and 7—are shown here because they are the three 
that make up the Interpersonal Management (IM) subscale. 
 
 
The first seven questions below are about situations that happen in schools like yours:  
  
3.    The principal of the school has told the students that this year there are no funds for 
after-school activities such as sports and art. Leticia and a lot of other students in the 
school are upset about losing these activities. They get together to decide what to do.  They 
think of the following ideas: 
Please rate each of these ideas: 
(You may check the same rating more than 
once) 
Very 
Bad Bad Good 
Very 
Good 
a.   begin an awareness campaign to get the 
community to understand how important sports 
and art are for the students 
o o o o 
b.   offer to paint the school building in return for 
money for after-school programs 
o o o o 
c.   tell them they don’t care about kids o o o o 
d.   write the school board and tell them they better 
restore the funds or there will be some very angry 
students 
o o o o 
Now check the one you think is the best choice. 
  a o b o c o d o   
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4.   Amy is very athletic and likes sports.  She particularly likes baseball and decides to 
try out for the school team one spring, even though there are no other girls on the team.  
During the tryouts, some of the boys start insulting her, saying that baseball is for boys 
and that they don’t want her on the team.  Amy tries out anyway, but the next day when 
the coach at school announces who made the team, Amy is not chosen.  Amy could: 
Please rate each of these ideas: 
(You may check the same rating more than 
once) 
Very 
Bad Bad Good 
Very 
Good 
a.   tell the coach “I know I played better than 
some of the boys who made the team.” 
o o o o 
b.   tell the coach she thinks he should realize she 
deserves to be on it 
o o o o 
c.   just don’t think about it o o o o 
d.   go to the coach to hear his reasons for not 
putting her on the team and explain her point of 
view to him 
o o o o 
Now check the one you think is the best choice. 




7.     Voula, a ninth grade student, wants to go to the high school school dance, but her 
father won’t let her because he thinks she is too young.  She could: 
  
Please rate each of these ideas: 
(You may check the same rating more than 
once) 
Very 




a.   refuse to talk to him because he’s stopping 
her from having fun 
o o o o   
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b.   tell him he can’t just keep telling her what to 
do now that she is in ninth grade 
o o o o   
c.   ask him to work with her on an agreement to 
deal with their concerns 
o o o o   
d.   explain to him why she feels she’s 
responsible enough to go to the dance 
o o o o   
Now check the one you think is the best choice. 
  ao bo co do   
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Appendix C:  
Social	Domain	Theory	Coding	Guidelines	
		 1. First	round:	Codability		 a. Codable:	response	seems	to	address	the	question	asked		b. Uncodable:	response	is	missing,	illegible,	nonsensical,	obviously	off-topic,	etc.		 2. Second	round:	SDT	domains		(Note:	Each	category	includes	all	positive	and/or	negative	references	to	the	considerations	within	that	category;	e.g.,	both	“They’re	hurting	him”	and	“They’re	not	really	hurting	him”	would	be	coded	as	SDT-Moral	due	to	the	focus	on	harm	or	lack	thereof.)				 a. Moral	domain:	Reason	addresses	the	inherent	rightness	vs.	wrongness	of	actions;	has	to	do	with	rules	that	are	more	universal.	References	any	of	the	following,	positively	or	negatively:	i. The	welfare/well-being	of	the	victim	or	others,	including	physical	harm	and/or	psychological	harm	(hurt	feelings,	etc.);	this	also	includes	empathy/perspective-taking	[e.g.,	how	would	they	feel	if	it	were	them;	I	wouldn’t	want	that	to	happen	to	me]	ii. Notions	of	justice,	fairness/equality,	or	rights	of	those	involved	in	the	situation	(other	than	the	respondent)		b. Conventional	domain:	Reason	addresses	the	structure	and/or	function	of	groups/society	and	how	to	maintain	them;	has	to	do	with	rules	but	that	could	potentially	be	changed,	based	on	social	consensus,	decisions	of	authority,	etc.	References	any	of	the	following,	positively	or	negatively:	i. External	rules,	dictates	of	authority,	etc.	(as	opposed	to	internal	notions	of	right	vs.	wrong)		ii. Group	functioning	and/or	group	identity	[e.g.,	we’re	not	like	that	at	this	school;	this	is	how	we	do	it]	iii. The	experience,	jurisdiction,	or	social	role(s)	of	authority	figures	(teachers,	etc.)	iv. Punishment/retribution,	especially	as	a	way	to	maintain	order		c. Personal	domain:	Reason	focuses	on	respondent’s	individual	concerns	and	choices;	has	to	do	with	things	that	should	not	be	regulated	by	moral	or	conventional	rules,	but	should	instead	be	under	individual	control.	References	any	of	the	following,	positively	or	negatively:		 i. Personal	autonomy/individuality	[e.g.,	I	am	like	this]	
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ii. Personal	preference/choice	[e.g.,	I	don’t	like	that;	I	don’t	want	to	get	involved]	iii. Privacy	[e.g.,	it’s	not	my	business]		d. Prudential	domain:	Reason	references	respondent’s	own	safety,	welfare,	and/or	practical	concerns	[e.g.,	I	might	get	hurt;	I	might	get	in	trouble;	they	might	turn	on	me;	it	wouldn’t	do	any	good].		e. Vague/no	domain:	Response	cannot	be	clearly	categorized	using	any	of	the	above	SDT	domain(s).			3. Third	round:	Non-SDT	considerations		 a. Emotion:	refers	to	the	role/influence	of	respondent’s	emotions,	or	lack	thereof,	in	motivating	behavior,	either	in	addition	to	or	without	explicit	reference	to	SDT	domain(s)	[e.g.,	I	would	be	too	scared;	it	makes	me	mad]		b. Relation:	Reason	refers	to	relationships	with	others	as	justifications	in	themselves,	either	in	addition	to	or	without	explicit	reference	to	SDT	domain(s);	includes	references	to	respondent’s	positive/present	or	negative/absent	relationship(s)	with	the	victim,	with	the	bullies,	and/or	with	the	larger	community	[e.g.,	I	would	intervene	if	they	were	my	friends]		c. Other:	Reason	concerns	other	consideration(s)	that	seem	important	in	the	response,	but	do	not	fit	into	the	SDT	domains	or	the	relational	or	emotional	categories	above;	such	reasons,	if	any,	will	be	noted	for	possible	future	work	but	not	analyzed	in	this	study.		
 
 
 	
